<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2005000300497</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v72i287.569</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La debilidad financiera y el comportamiento depredador en la financiación de la deuda]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fernández Ruiz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jorge]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,El Colegio de México  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>72</volume>
<numero>287</numero>
<fpage>497</fpage>
<lpage>521</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000300497&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000300497&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000300497&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Una teoría de la depredación ampliamente conocida sostiene que las empresas con recursos financieros abundantes pueden realizar prácticas depredadoras para expulsar del mercado a sus competidores financieramente débiles. Sin embargo, un competidor financieramente débil que actúe de modo racional debe tomar en cuenta esta amenaza depredadora cuando elabore sus pasivos financieros. En este artículo examinamos cómo responde de manera óptima una empresa financieramente débil que se financia con deuda ante una amenaza depredadora, cuando existe selección adversa en los mercados financieros. Más precisamente, investigamos cómo cambia la estructura de maduración de su deuda ante tal amenaza. Mostramos que su respuesta óptima puede o no disuadir el comportamiento depredador. En caso de disuasión, ésta se logra remplazando deuda de corto plazo por la de largo plazo. En caso de que la empresa financieramente débil opte por no disuadir el comportamiento depredador, se financiará de manera exclusiva con deuda de corto plazo.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract A widely known theory of predation holds that firms with ample financial resources may prey on their financially weak rivals to drive them out of the market. Yet, rational weak firms should take this predatory threat into account when designing its financial liabilities. In this paper, we examine the optimal financial response by a debt-financed firm to the threat of predation when there is adverse selection in financial markets. Specifically, we focus on how the debt maturity structure optimally changes as a reaction to this threat. We show that the optimal response may or may not be to deter predation. If it is optimal to deter predation, this is achieved by a lengthening of the debt maturity structure: some short-term debt is replaced with long-term debt. If it is optimal to acquiesce to predation, pure short-term debt is chosen.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[depredación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estructura de vencimientos de deuda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[cartera grande]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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