<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872022000100129</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2022.16.17033</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[¿Es necesaria la regla de precedente?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Are rules governing the use of precedent necessary?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pulido Ortiz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Fabio Enrique]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de La Sabana Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>16</numero>
<fpage>129</fpage>
<lpage>154</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872022000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872022000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872022000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Este trabajo se ocupa de la pregunta por el carácter contingente o necesario de la regla de precedente en los ordenamientos jurídicos. Se argumenta que la regla de precedente en sentido amplio (aquella que configura el funcionamiento de los precedentes judiciales) es una norma necesaria de los sistemas jurídicos. En el trabajo se identifican tres formas (exhaustivas y excluyentes) que puede adoptar la regla de precedente: a) una regla de precedente vinculante, b) una regla de precedente como admisión, y c) una regla de precedente como rechazo. Se concluye que la forma que adopte la regla de precedente es contingente en cada ordenamiento jurídico. No obstante, bien sea por las razones conceptuales asociadas a la noción de normas de competencia o por la centralidad del principio de legalidad, lo cierto es que en aquellos ordenamientos jurídicos que no contemplen las condiciones para crear, modificar y aplicar precedentes judiciales se debe entender que existe implícitamente una regla de precedente como rechazo.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper addresses the issue of the necessary or contingent nature of the rules governing the use of precedent in legal systems. The author argues that the rules governing the use of precedent in a broad sense (rules that define the legal operation of judicial precedent) are necessary in of legal systems. This paper identifies three different (exclusive and exhaustive) kinds of rules governing the use of precedent: a) binding rules governing the use of precedent, b) rules admitting the use of precedent and c) rules rejecting the use of precedent. It is concluded that the way the rules governing the use of precedent is established depends on each legal system. Even so, whether because of the conceptual reasons associated with the rules of competence or the centrality of the rule of law, when a legal system does not define the conditions to create, amend and apply judicial precedents, it can be said there are implicit rules rejecting the use of precedent.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[precedente judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regla de precedente]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normas constitutivas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normas de competencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normas prescriptivas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Judicial Precedent]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rule of Precedent]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Constitutive Rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Power-Conferring Rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Mandatory Rules]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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