<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872020000100125</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2020.14.14907</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Incommensurability, Social Practices and Moral Dilemmas: A Rejoinder to Heidi Hurd&#8217;s Anti-Perspectivalism]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Inconmesurabilidad, prácticas sociales y dilemas morales: una réplica al anti-perspectivalismo de Heidi Hurd]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bustamante]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Thomas]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Decat]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Thiago Lopes]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Federal University of Minas Gerais  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Belo Horizonte MG]]></addr-line>
<country>Brazil</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Federal University of Minas Gerais  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Belo Horizonte MG]]></addr-line>
<country>Brazil</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>14</numero>
<fpage>125</fpage>
<lpage>146</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872020000100125&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872020000100125&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872020000100125&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The paper criticizes Hurd&#8217;s rejection of role-related perspectivalism about moral duties. Raz&#8217;s notion of value incomensurability is used to defy the correspondence thesis according to which the justifiability of an action determines the justifiability of allowing or preventing this action. Against Hurd&#8217;s Hohfeldian reconstruction of incommensurable choices as &#8220;liberties&#8221; that &#8220;lack moral value of any sort&#8221;, the argument highlights the moral significance of the fact that the choice among incommensurable options is still action for a reason. Incommensurability is explained, then, as a consequence of the social dependence of values on social practices and of the constitutive role of conventions in shaping social relations, personal projects, goals and the responsibilities that define them. It is argued that the severity of the problem of perspectivalism for Hurd is due to her narrow conception morality and that a wider conception that integrates obligations towards others with the requirements of personal integrity is superior. The agent&#8217;s goals, relationships and projects take part in moral reasoning since the value incommensurability they make possible is required for value pluralism and personal autonomy. The argument concludes suggesting that a non-positivist, interpretivist conception of legal practice, although acknowledging residual moral combat, would reduce its occurrence and relevance.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El documento critica el rechazo de Hurd al perspectivalismo relacionado con los roles sobre los deberes morales. La noción de incomensurabilidad de valores de Raz se utiliza para desafiar la tesis de la correspondencia, según la cual la justificación de una acción determina la justificación de permitir o impedir esta acción. En contra de la reconstrucción hohfeldiana de Hurd de elecciones inconmensurables como &#8220;libertades&#8221; que &#8220;carecen de cualquier tipo de valor moral&#8221;, el argumento destaca el significado moral del hecho de que la elección entre opciones inconmensurables sigue siendo acción por una razón. La inconmensurabilidad se explica, pues, como consecuencia de la dependencia social de los valores con respecto a las prácticas sociales y del papel constitutivo de las convenciones en la configuración de las relaciones sociales, los proyectos personales, los objetivos y las responsabilidades que los definen. Se argumenta que la gravedad del problema del perspectivalismo para Hurd se debe a su estrecha concepción de la moral y que es superior una concepción más amplia que integre las obligaciones hacia los demás con los requisitos de la integridad personal. Los objetivos, relaciones y proyectos del agente participan en el razonamiento moral, ya que la inconmensurabilidad de valores que posibilitan es necesaria para el pluralismo de valores y la autonomía personal. El argumento concluye sugiriendo que una concepción no positivista e interpretativista de la práctica jurídica, aunque reconozca el combate moral residual, reduciría su ocurrencia y relevancia.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Inconmensurabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prácticas sociales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[perspectivalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[valor]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[dilema moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Incomensurability]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Social Practices]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Perspectivalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Value]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral Dilemma]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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