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<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872018000100059</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2018.12.12443</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Reasons, Rationality, Reasoning: How Much Pulling-Apart?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Razones, racionalidad, razonamiento: ¿qué tanto podemos desprenderlos?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Worsnip]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Alex]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,The University of North Carolina  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Chapel Hill ]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>12</numero>
<fpage>59</fpage>
<lpage>93</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
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