<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872016000100091</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A New Interpretivist Conception of the Rule of Law]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Una nueva concepción interpretivista del Estado de derecho]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kyritsis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Dimitrios]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Reading School of Law ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>GB</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>10</numero>
<fpage>91</fpage>
<lpage>109</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100091&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100091&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100091&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:Ronald Dworkin argues that the content of the law is limited to the set of judicially enforceable rights. For him, legality, the value that law distinctively serves when it goes well, is primarily a virtue of judicial decision-making. The purpose of this article is to criticize Dworkin's court-centrism on the ground that it delivers an impoverished conception of legality. Legality has a systemic as well as an adjudicative dimension. In its systemic dimension it requires that government as a whole is structured in a way that guarantees the proper exercise of public power. Accordingly, for a legal system to exhibit the value of legality, it is not sufficient that its judges direct the use of state coercion under certain conditions. Additionally the exercise of public power must accord with a scheme of separation of powers that is geared towards justice. Not all the requirements of legality thus understood are judicially enforceable. This expansive conception of legality is underpinned by a theory of political legitimacy that differs from Dworkin's. Legitimacy is not merely a retail thing. A political community is also legitimate when it has standing guarantees for the proper exercise of power. Separation of powers is crucial among them.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:Ronald Dworkin sostiene que el contenido del derecho se limita al conjunto de derechos sujetos a ser adjudicados ante los tribunales. Para Dworkin, el valor de la "legalidad", es decir, el valor que sirve el derecho de manera distintiva cuando funciona adecuadamente, es una virtud de las decisiones judiciales. El objetivo de este artículo es criticar el enfoque hacia las cortes de Dworkin, dado que proporciona una concepción empobrecida de lo que es el valor de la "legalidad", argumentaré que la legalidad tiene una dimensión tanto sistemática, como adjudicativa. En su dimensión sistemática, exige que el gobierno en su conjunto esté estructurado de tal forma que garantice el ejercicio adecuado del poder público. Por lo tanto, para que un sistema jurídico presente el valor de la legalidad, no es suficiente que los jueces emprendan el uso de la coerción del Estado bajo ciertas condiciones. Además, el ejercicio del poder público tiene que ser acorde con un esquema de separación de poderes con un objetivo de justicia. Así entendidas, no todas las exigencias de la legalidad son sujetas a ser adjudicadas judicialmente. Esta concepción más amplia de la legalidad que sostengo, se basa en una teoría de legitimidad política que difiere de la de Dworkin. La legitimidad no es un asunto al por menor. Una comunidad política también es legítima cuando tiene garantías sólidas para el ejercicio adecuado del poder, y la separación de poderes resulta crucial entre ellas.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Estado de derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[legalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[legitimidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[separación de poderes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[interpretivismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rule of Law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legitimacy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Separation of Powers]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Interpretivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dworkin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ronald]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Justice in Robes]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dworkin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ronald]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Justice for Hedgehogs]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dworkin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ronald]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Law's Empire]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Hart Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Moral Impact Theory of Law]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Greenberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Mark]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Yale Law Journal]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<volume>123</volume>
<page-range>1288</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The End of Jurisprudence]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hershovitz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Scott]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Yale Law Journal]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>124</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hershovitz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Scott]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[ExploringLaw's Empire : The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[What is Good About Legal Conventionalism]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kyritsis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Dimitrios]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Legal Theory]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>14</volume>
<page-range>135-66</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rawls]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[John]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Freeman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Collected Papers]]></source>
<year>1999</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sager]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Larry]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Justice in Plainclothes]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Yale University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapiro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Scott]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Legality]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stavropoulos]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nicos]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal Interpretivism]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zalta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waldron]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jeremy]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Fordham Law Review]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<page-range>1697</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waldron]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jeremy]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hershovitz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Scott]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[ExploringLaw's Empire : The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Judges as Moral Reasoners]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waldron]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jeremy]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[International Journal of Constitutional Law]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>7</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
