<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872016000100063</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA['The Positivist May be Right'. Legal Conventionalism Revisited]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA["El positivista podría estar en lo correcto". Convencionalismo jurídico en revisión]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Letsas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[George]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University College London  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>GB</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>10</numero>
<fpage>63</fpage>
<lpage>89</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100063&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100063&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100063&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:This paper revisits Ronald Dworkin's distinction between concurrent and conventional morality. The first part of the paper argues that this distinction is best understood as being about normative, not motivating, reasons.Thus understood, the challenge that the distinction poses to Hart's social rule theory is different to the one assumed in the relevant literature. It is that conventional practices generate genuine normative reasons (or obligations), but that Hart's theory gives an inadequate account of these reasons. The second part of the paper argues that there is a significant shift in Dworkin's approach to conventionalism, between his early and his later work. In Model of Rules II, Dworkin leaves it open that a revised version of conventionalism, free from the inadequacies of Hart's account, can help vindicate a positivist account of legal obligation. In Law's Empire however, positivism is equated with the version of conventionalism that was earlier found to be inadequate. The paper concludes by suggesting that Dworkin's own theory of 'law as integrity', can be understood as conventionalist in the revised version that his earlier work leaves open.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:Este artículo lleva a cabo una revisión a la distinción de Dworkin acerca de la moralidad concurrente y convencional. La primera parte del artículo argumenta que la distinción se entiende mejor como una referente a razones normativas, no a razones motivacionales. Así entendida esta distinción, el reto que se le presenta a Hart y su teoría acerca de las reglas sociales es distinta a la que comúnmente se discute en la literatura. Esto es, las prácticas convencionales generan razones normativas genuinas (u obligaciones), pero la teoría de Hart da una explicación deficiente de estas razones. La segunda parte del artículo argumenta que existe un giro importante en el enfoque de Dworkin hacia el convencionalismo, esto entre sus primeros ensayos y los últimos. Por ejemplo, en el "Modelo de las Reglas II", Dworkin deja abierta la posibilidad de que una versión revisada y mejorada del convencionalismo libre de los problemas de la explicación hartiana, pueda reivindicar al positivismo en su explicación de lo que es una obligación jurídica. En Law's Empire sin embargo, el positivismo se equipara con la versión del convencionalismo que antes se consideró inadecuada. Este artículo concluye que la propia teoría de Dworkin del "derecho como integridad" puede ser entendida como una teoría convencionalista de la versión revisada, una posibilidad que su trabajo inicial dejó abierta.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Convencionalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[obligación jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[moral convencional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razones normativas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[derecho como integridad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Conventionalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Obligation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Conventional Morality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[normative reasons]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Law as Integrity]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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