<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872016000100023</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Legal Interpretivism]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Interpretativismo jurídico]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stavropoulos]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nicos]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Oxford University  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>GB</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>10</numero>
<fpage>23</fpage>
<lpage>61</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100023&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100023&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100023&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:Interpretivism about law offers a philosophical explanation of the impact of institutional practice -the legally significant action and practices of political institutions- on legal rights and obligations. It says that how institutional practice affects the law is determined by certain principles, identified by interpretation, which explain why the practice should have that role. I distinguish between hybrid interpretivism, which has been extensively discussed in the literature, and a non-hybrid version that has been completely neglected. The key difference between the two lies in the role of morality in each. In the hybrid version, morality is used to process a set of institutionally conveyed norms, so as to make the set as morally attractive as possible and thereby to ensure that morality ratifies the rights and obligations that obtain under it. This operation gives rise to the problem of choosing among possible trade-offs between moral appeal and fidelity to the past, which seems intractable. In the non-hybrid version, problems such as this do not arise. Morality ultimately determines the content of the law, by determining the moral relevance of institutional action. On this view, legal rights and obligations are a subset of genuine moral rights and obligations: those that obtain in virtue of institutional action.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:El interpretativismo sobre el derecho ofrece una explicación filosófica del impacto que tiene la práctica institucional - las acciones jurídicas relevantes y prácticas de las instituciones políticas - sobre los derechos y obligaciones jurídicas. Explica que la forma en que la práctica institucional afecta al derecho es determinada por ciertos principios, identificados a través de la interpretación, que explican por qué la práctica debe tener ese papel. En este artículo distingo entre interpretativismo híbrido, el cual ha sido extensamente discutido en la literatura, y una versión no-híbrida que considero ha sido completamente ignorada. La principal diferencia entre las dos versiones es el papel que desempeña la moral en cada una. En la versión híbrida, la moral es usada para procesar un conjunto de normas expedidas institucionalmente, para hacer de ese conjunto, un conjunto moralmente atractivo y asegurar que la moral ratifique los derechos y obligaciones institucionales. Sin embargo, esta versión genera el problema de elegir entre lo moralmente atractivo y una fidelidad hacia el pasado, lo cual resulta problemático. En la versión no-híbrida, estos problemas no se presentan porque la moralidad finalmente determina el contenido del derecho, al determinar la relevancia moral de las acciones institucionales. Desde esta perspectiva, los derechos y obligaciones jurídicas, son un subconjunto de derechos y obligaciones morales genuinas: es decir, aquellas que se obtienen en virtud de la acción institucional.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Interpretativismo jurídico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[naturaleza del derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido del derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[obligación jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[obligación moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Interpretivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Nature of Law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Content of Law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Obligation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral Obligation]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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