<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1870-6622</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[EconoQuantum]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[EconoQuantum]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1870-6622</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de Guadalajara]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1870-66222020000200033</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18381/eq.v17i2.7170</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un análisis formal]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Party system and efficiency of public goods supply: a formal model]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gatica Arreola]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Leonardo Adalberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Guadalajara  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>17</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>33</fpage>
<lpage>56</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1870-66222020000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1870-66222020000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1870-66222020000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:  Objetivo  Avanzar en una explicación teórica sobre el efecto que tiene el sistema de partidos sobre el uso eficiente de los recursos públicos, particularmente sobre el uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental.  Metodología  Se desarrolla un modelo formal para abordar el problema antes descrito.  Resultados  Se presenta un modelo formal que logra capturar cómo el incremento del número de partidos políticos que compiten en una economía incentiva un mayor uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental.  Limitaciones  Si bien este trabajo busca explicar los resultados de otros análisis empíricos y avanzar en términos teóricos, únicamente presenta un modelo formal sin aportar evidencia empírica.  Originalidad  A saber del autor, hasta la fecha no hay en la literatura un modelo teórico que, enfocado en el uso del empleo gubernamental, explique los efectos que el sistema de partidos puede tener en el empleo clientelar de los recursos públicos.  Conclusiones  El modelo explica como la presencia de un mayor número de partidos genera nuevos grupos de votantes políticamente rentables, que pueden ser capturados por el partido en el gobierno mediante el ofrecimiento de empleo burocrático.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:  Objective  To advance in a theoretical explanation about the effect of party systems and political competition on government performance, relative to the provision of public goods and clientelistc private goods.  Methodology  I build and present a theoretical model to address the cited problem.  Results  The model describes how the rise in the number of competing political parties encourages the clientelistic behavior of incumbents.  Limitations  Despite the paper explains some known empirical facts, it does not present any empirical analysis and evidence.  Originality  The paper presents an original formal model based on the government employment to analyze the effect that the party system has over government performance.  Conclusion  The main result shows that the increase in the number of parties within the system, diminishes public goods delivers and encourages clientelistic expenditures.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Sistema de partidos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[eficiencia gubernamental]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[clientelismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[provisión de bienes públicos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[D72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[D73]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H41]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Party system]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[government efficiency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[clientelism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public goods provision]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[D72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[D73]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H41]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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