<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1870-0063</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Andamios]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Andamios]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1870-0063</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México, Colegio de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1870-00632019000300019</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.29092/uacm.v16i41.713</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La lógica y sus aplicaciones: ¿platonismo o no-platonismo?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Logic and its applications: Platonism or non-Platonism?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bueno]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Otávio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vivanco]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Melisa]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Miami University Departamento de filosofía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Florida]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Miami University Departamento de filosofía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Florida]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>16</volume>
<numero>41</numero>
<fpage>19</fpage>
<lpage>41</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1870-00632019000300019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1870-00632019000300019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1870-00632019000300019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo examinamos la aplicación de la lógica desde dos concepciones filosóficas opuestas y evaluamos comparativamente sus méritos. La primera es una concepción monista platonista, que caracteriza la relación de consecuencia lógica como una relación abstracta entre proposiciones. Esta propuesta, que insiste en el tema de la neutralidad, armoniza muy bien con la objetividad que naturalmente le atribuimos a la lógica. Desde esta perspectiva, la neutralidad de la lógica garantizaría que no haya restricciones derivadas de temas particulares, siendo así, un sistema universal y, por tanto, aplicable a contextos variables. En contraste, presentamos una concepción pluralista no-platonista, que caracteriza la variedad de relaciones de consecuencia lógica como algo concreto, dependiente del contexto, involucrado en casos particulares y dependiente de temas. Esta concepción no requiere de la suposición de entidades que pueden parecer altamente misteriosas, por lo que encuentra un camino adecuado para explicar las aplicaciones lógicas. Concluimos que, dado que cada postura tiene sus propias virtudes explicativas, el debate ontológico deberá dirimirse apelando a un análisis que considere también otras instancias además de la cuestión de las aplicaciones de la lógica.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In this paper, we examine two conceptions of the application of logic and assess their comparative merits. The first is a platonist monist conception that characterizes the logical consequence relation as an abstract relation among propositions. We argue that this proposal, which insists on logic&#8217;s topic neutrality, accommodates very well the objectivity of logic. From this perspective, there are no constraints from particular topics. As a result, we have the universality that allows us going through a wide scope of contexts where logic is applied. In contrast, a non-platonist pluralist conception is examined and it characterizes the variety of logical consequence relations as something concrete, context-dependent involved in particular cases, and topic dependent. As will become clear, this conception is particularly well suited to make room for the applications of logic. We conclude that, in order to solve the ontological debate about logic, we need to go beyond its applications.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Consecuencia lógica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[aplicabilidad de la lógica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lógicas no clásicas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[pluralismo lógico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[platonismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Logical consequence]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[application of logic]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[non-classical logics]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[logical pluralism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Platonism]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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