<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1870-0063</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Andamios]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Andamios]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1870-0063</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México, Colegio de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1870-00632016000200037</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La distinción metodológica entre el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional: un análisis epistemológico]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The methodological distinction between theoretical language and observational language: an epistemological analysis]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Islas Mondragón]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Damián]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Durango]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>13</volume>
<numero>31</numero>
<fpage>37</fpage>
<lpage>59</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1870-00632016000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1870-00632016000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1870-00632016000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos y contraargumentos realistas y antirrealistas que se han construido a favor y en contra de la capacidad científica para producir conocimiento objetivo y verdadero acerca del mundo social y natural. Argumento que el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional con el que los científicos sociales y naturales se refieren a las diversas entidades, fenómenos, propiedades y procesos científicos observables e inobservables están determinados, en la práctica, por sus tradiciones teóricas de investigación, lo cual muestra que la metodología científica depende en cierta medida de las teorías que son, a lo sumo, un proceder constructivo y no un proceder de descubrimiento.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In this paper I analyze the main arguments and counterarguments proposed by realists and anti-realists stances for and against the scientific ability to produce objective and true scientific knowledge about the social and natural world. I argue that the theoretical and observational language which social and natural scientists use to refer to several scientific observable and unobservable entities, phenomena, properties and processes are determined, in practice, by their theoretical research traditions. This shows that scientific methodology depends so heavily on scientific theories that is, at most, a constructive procedure and not a discovery procedure.]]></p></abstract>
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<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Realismo científico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[constructivismo empírico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lenguaje teórico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lenguaje observacional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[entidades observables]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[entidades inobservables]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Scientific realism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[empirical constructivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[theoretical language]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[observational language]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[observable entities]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[unobservable entities]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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