<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-5346</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista mexicana de economía y finanzas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. mex. econ. finanz]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-5346</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-53462022000200007</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21919/remef.v17i2.523</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[An Analysis of Optimal Tax Revenue Sharing for Mexico]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Un análisis de la participación óptima en los ingresos fiscales de México]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ponce Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Raúl Alberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ponce Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Benito Alan]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>17</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-53462022000200007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-53462022000200007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-53462022000200007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract We develop an analysis that identifies the characteristics of an optimal system of shared tax collection and intergovernmental transfers. Mathematical optimization is used to find the level of taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Formulas for the optimal level of taxes and transfers to subnational governments are characterized. We suggest reforms to intergovernmental transfers to include the costs of tax inefficiency, some tax equalization transfer rules, and the marginal social benefits of local public spending. Future research could include local public spending with regional externalities, migration, and consider a dynamic model. This article proposes an original theoretical model of optimal tax coordination and transfers. The optimal level of taxes and transfers are identified. This paper proposes reforms to the participation formula for subnational governments.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Se desarrolla un análisis que identifica las características de un sistema óptimo de recaudación tributaria compartida y transferencias intergubernamentales. Se utiliza la técnica de optimización para encontrar el nivel de impuestos y transferencias intergubernamentales. Se caracterizan fórmulas para el nivel óptimo de impuestos y transferencias a gobiernos subnacionales. Reformar las participaciones al incluir los costos de ineficiencia de los impuestos, algunas normas de transferencias de ecualización fiscal, y los beneficios sociales marginales del gasto público local. Para futuras investigaciones se podrían incluir el gasto público local con externalidades regionales, la migración, y considerar un modelo dinámico. Este artículo propone un modelo teórico original de coordinación de impuestos y transferencias óptimas. Se identifican el nivel óptimo de impuestos y transferencias. Este trabajo propone reformas a la fórmula de participaciones a gobiernos subnacionales.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H2]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H7]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H77]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Tax revenue sharing]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[optimal taxation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[state and local expenditures]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[fiscal federalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H2]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H7]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H77]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ingresos tributarios compartidos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[impuestos óptimos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gastos estatales y locales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[federalismo fiscal]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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