<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-1324</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Signos filosóficos]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Sig. Fil]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-1324</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-13242016000100052</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Factores causales invariantes en ciencias sociales y su importancia en la implementación de políticas. Una visión crítica]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Invariant causal factors in the social sciences and its importance for policy implementation. A critique]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ivarola]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Leonardo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Centro de Investigaciones en Epistemología de las Ciencias Económicas]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>18</volume>
<numero>35</numero>
<fpage>52</fpage>
<lpage>81</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000100052&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000100052&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000100052&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Las corrientes manipulabilistas tradicionales consideran que una implementación de política efectiva debe estar fundamentada en un conocimiento invariante. Este modo de pensamiento está basado en el supuesto ontológico de que existen factores causales estables tanto en las ciencias naturales como en las sociales. También asumen que un sólo tipo de intervención ex-ante es pertinente para una implementación efectiva. En el presente artículo se realizará una crítica a estos enfoques. En particular, se mostrará que los procesos sociales responden a una lógica de &#8220;árboles de posibilidades&#8221; o &#8220;resultados de final abierto&#8221;. Sobre la base de esta variante ontológica se argumentará que más que un conocimiento de factores invariantes, el sustento de una buena política debe buscarse en los condicionamientos explicitados dentro de un anteproyecto y en la factibilidad de que los mismos se satisfagan en el sistema objetivo. Asimismo, se mostrará cómo las típicas intervenciones ex-ante no son adecuadas en el reino de lo social. Contrario a ellos, las intervenciones deberán ser sistemáticas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract Traditional manipulabilistic accounts consider that an effective policy implementation must be grounded on an invariant knowledge. This mode of thought is based on the ontological assumption that there are stable causal factors, both in the natural and in the social sciences. They also assume that only the ex-ante intervention is relevant for an effective implementation. In this article a critique of these approaches is carried out. In particular, it is shown that social processes do not fit into the logic of stable causal factors like mechanisms or nomological machines, but they are more suited to the logic of possibility trees or open-ended-results. On the basis of this ontological variation it will be argued that rather than seeking the support of an effective policy in a knowledge of invariant factors, it must be sought in the explicit constraints of a blueprint and in their feasibility of being satisfied in the target system. Furthermore, it will be shown that typical ex-ante interventions are not appropriate in the social realm. On the contrary, and in order to correct any kind of contingencies in a social process, interventions must be systematic.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[implementación de política]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[resultados de final abierto]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[procesos sociales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[invarianza]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[policy implementation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[open-ended-results]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[social processes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[invariance]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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