<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-1324</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Signos filosóficos]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Sig. Fil]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-1324</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-13242007000200127</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Hacia una Justificación trascendental de la Inducción]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pinto]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Sílvio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Iztapalapa ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2007</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2007</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>9</volume>
<numero>18</numero>
<fpage>127</fpage>
<lpage>160</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000200127&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000200127&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000200127&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Con el descubrimiento de la lógica inductiva bayesiana se ha renovado el optimismo acerca de la posibilidad de justificación de la inferencia inductiva. La justificación de las reglas inductivas bayesianas se conoce como el argumento del libro de apuestas holandés (el teorema de Ramsey-de Finetti). La cuestión que divide a los teóricos de la inducción es si tal argumento es realmente capaz de justificar las reglas de condicionalización de Bayes y de Jeffrey (las reglas inductivas bayesianas). Aquí me interesa, en primer lugar, distinguir dos problemas de justificación respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por el otro, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, busco relacionar la cuestión de la justificación de las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas con el clásico problema propuesto por David Hume de la justificación persuasiva de la causalidad y de la inducción. En tercer lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti no es capaz de proporcionar una justificación persuasiva de las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en consonancia con la tesis negativa de Hume acerca de la posibilidad de justificación no-circular de las inferencias de tipo inductivo. Finalmente, sugiero una justificación explicativa para las reglas inductivas de la teoría bayesiana en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract With the discovery of Bayesian inductive logic optimism about the possibility of rationally justifying inductive inference has been renewed. The justification of Bayesian inductive rules is known as the Dutch-book argument (Ramsey-de Finetti theorem). The question dividing theoreticians of induction is whether such an argument can really justify Bayes&#8217; and Jeffrey&#8217;s conditionalization rules (Bayesian inductive rules). In this paper, I will be interested, first, in distinguishing two senses of justification of inductive inference: on the one hand, persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, its explicative justification. Secondly, I will relate the problem of the justification of Bayesian conditionalization rules with Hume&#8217;s classical problem of persuasively justifying causality and induction. Thirdly, I shall argue that the Dutch-book argument cannot persuasively justify Bayesian conditionalization rules in agreement with Hume&#8217;s negative thesis concerning non-circular justification of inductive inference of a causal type. Finally, I will suggest a sort of explicative justification of Bayesian inductive rules in terms of a transcendental argument of kantian inspiration but davidsonian in its style.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[bayesianismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[causalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[condicionalización]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[explicación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[inducción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[bayesianism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[causality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[conditionalization]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[explanation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[induction]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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