<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-0565</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Espiral (Guadalajara)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Espiral (Guadalaj.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-0565</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-05652021000300041</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[En búsqueda de un equilibrio elusivo: un análisis comparativo de la elección social y la elección pública]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Solís Delgadillo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diego]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cortez Salinas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Josafat]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,El Colegio de San Luis, A. C.  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,UNAM Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>28</volume>
<numero>82</numero>
<fpage>41</fpage>
<lpage>74</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-05652021000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-05652021000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-05652021000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen La elección social y elección pública son teorías con supuestos compartidos. No obstante, cada una de ellas ofrece respuestas distintas al problema de inestabilidad en la toma de decisiones. En este trabajo se clarifican las similitudes y diferencias entre estas dos teorías. La elección social asume una situación de agregación de preferencias individuales, en donde los individuos tienen preferencias ordinales preestablecidas y donde los actores no interactúan entre sí. En cambio, la elección pública sostiene que las decisiones políticas son resultados de interacción, especialmente de intercambios entre los actores políticos que valoran los temas con distintas intensidades.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract Social Choice and Public Choice are theories that share theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, each one offers different solutions to the instability problem of decision making.This article seeks to clarify the similarities and differences between these theories. In a nutshell, social choice studies the aggregation of individual preferences;the theory assumes that individuals have ordinal preferences and that these actors do not interact with each other. In contrast, public choice maintains that political decisions are the result of interactions, particularly exchanges among political actors who value issues with different intensity.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[elección social]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[elección pública]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[logrolling]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teorema de la imposibilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teorema del votante mediano]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[equilibrio estructuralmente inducido]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[social choice]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public choice]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[logrolling]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[impossibility theorem]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[median voter theorem]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[structural induced equilibrium]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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