<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0301-7036</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problemas del desarrollo]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Prob. Des]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0301-7036</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0301-70362020000400137</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iiec.20078951e.2020.203.69499</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sistemas electorales y su influencia en el diseño de la política ambiental]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Electoral systems and their influence on environmental policy design]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ponce Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Raúl Alberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rodríguez Hernández]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Alan Adrián]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (UACJ)  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>51</volume>
<numero>203</numero>
<fpage>137</fpage>
<lpage>166</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0301-70362020000400137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0301-70362020000400137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0301-70362020000400137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Se presenta el desarrollo de un análisis comparativo del impacto de los sistemas electorales mayoritarios y de representación proporcional en una política de impuestos que busca reducir la contaminación. Los resultados obtenidos son los siguientes: en un sistema electoral mayoritario, la regulación ambiental es extrema con impuestos muy bajos o altos en comparación a la política socialmente óptima; en un sistema de representación proporcional, la política ambiental es moderada (el impuesto se encuentra en una posición intermedia con relación en los impuestos implementados en un sistema mayoritario); y la política ambiental en sistemas de representación proporcional se aproxima más a la política socialmente óptima. Instituciones electorales explican estos resultados a través del número de partidos efectivos y la negociación legislativa en el Congreso.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This article undertakes a comparative analysis of the respective effects of majority and proportional representation electoral systems on tax policies designed to reduce pollution. The following findings were obtained: in a majority electoral system, environmental regulation is extreme with very low or high taxes compared to a socially optimal policy; in a proportional representation system, environmental policy is moderate (taxes are moderate compared to taxes implemented in a majority system); and environmental policy in proportional representation systems more closely resembles a socially optimal policy. Electoral institutions account for these findings, which are due to the number of effective parties and legislative negotiation in Congress.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contaminación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[impuestos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[política ambiental]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regulación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[modelo teórico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[sistema electoral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[democracia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[D72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[E62]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H23]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Q56]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Q58]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[pollution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[taxes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[environmental policy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[regulation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[theoretical model]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[electoral system]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[democracy]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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