<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-6649</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-6649</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-66492022000100349</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21555/top.v62i0.1594</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sobre la distinción entre los principios epistémicos de clausura y de transmisión]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[On the Distinction Between the Epistemic Principles of Closure and Transmission]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rodríguez Téllez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diego]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Javeriana  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Cali]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>04</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>04</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>62</numero>
<fpage>349</fpage>
<lpage>381</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-66492022000100349&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-66492022000100349&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-66492022000100349&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que dos afirmaciones que suelen mencionarse en cualquier presentación mínimamente detallada del principio epistémico de clausura son inconsistentes, a saber, que el principio de clausura explica cómo ampliamos nuestro conocimiento a través de deducciones y que este principio se distingue del principio epistémico de transmisión. Una discusión en la que esto sucede es la que se da en torno al diagnóstico adecuado de razonamientos, como el involucrado en el caso de las cebras de Dretske. Para desarrollar mi postura, en primer lugar, introduzco la distinción entre los principios de clausura y de transmisión de la manera en que usualmente es presentada. Segundo, expongo las motivaciones más fuertes detrás de los principios; en particular, establezco que la motivación central detrás del de clausura consiste en explicar el fenómeno de ampliación del conocimiento mediante la deducción. Tercero, basado en la identificación de una restricción sobre cualquier formulación apropiada de clausura capaz de explicar el fenómeno mencionado, cuestiono la aceptación de la distinción entre este principio y el de transmisión. Finamente, concluyo que cualquier formulación del principio epistémico de clausura que satisfaga la motivación central tras el principio lo colapsa con el principio epistémico de transmisión.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper argues that two claims usually included in any minimally detailed presentation of the epistemic closure principle are inconsistent. The first claim states that the closure principle explains how we extend our knowledge through deduction, while the second claim states that the closure principle is different from another epistemic principle, namely, the principle of transmission. The attempt to offer a correct diagnosis of reasonings such as the one involved in Dretske&#8217;s zebra case is an instance of a discussion in which the distinction plays a role. To defend my position, I first introduce the distinction between closure and transmission following the standard presentation. Second, I introduce the main motivations behind the principles; in particular, I establish that the main motivation behind closure consists in explaining the phenomenon that we extend our knowledge through deductive reasoning. Third, based on the identification of a restriction on any plausible formulation of closure capable of explaining this phenomenon, I cast doubt on the distinction between this principle and transmission. I conclude that any formulation of the epistemic principle of closure which satisfies its main motivation collapses into the epistemic principle of transmission.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[principio de clausura]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[principio de transmisión]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[deducción competente]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prueba de Moore]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conocimiento]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[closure principle]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[transmission principle]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[competent deduction]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moore&#8217;s proof]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[knowledge]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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