<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-6649</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-6649</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-66492021000100037</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21555/top.v0i60.1139</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Una defensa genealógica del no purismo en la justificación epistémica]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A Genealogical Defense of Non-Purism in Epistemic Justification]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rimoldi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Florencia]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>60</numero>
<fpage>37</fpage>
<lpage>73</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-66492021000100037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-66492021000100037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-66492021000100037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este trabajo defiendo una concepción no purista de la justificación epistémica, según la cual ésta depende en parte de factores &#8220;no conducentes a la verdad&#8221;, como el contexto pragmático de las personas. Para ello pongo en relación tres perspectivas distintas sobre la noción de creencia justificada. En la primera sección analizo los aspectos prominentes de la noción pre-teórica. En la segunda sección defiendo una posición no purista permisiva que recoge teóricamente los elementos de la noción pre-teórica y los amplía hacia el no purismo. En la tercera sección defiendo esta posición mediante una explicación genealógica del origen del concepto.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In this work I propose and defend a non-purist conception of epistemic justification according to which the latter depends in part on non truth-conducive factors, such as the pragmatic context of people. To do so, I present three distinct perspectives on the notion of justified belief. In the first section I analyze the most salient aspects of the pre-theoretical notion. In the second section I defend a non-purist permisive view that recovers the elements of the pre-theoretic view in a theoretical manner and extends them towards non-purism. In the third section I defend this latter view by means of a genealogical account of the origin of the concept of justification.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[creencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[acción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[genealogía]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[belief]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[action]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[genealogy]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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<source><![CDATA[Knowledge and its Limits]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
