<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-6649</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-6649</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-66492016000200055</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21555/top.v0i0.762</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El esencialismo individuativo de Wiggins y la función de los juicios de modalidad de re]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Wiggins' individuative essentialism and the function of de re modality judgements]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[González Varela]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[José Edgar]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,UNAM Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>51</numero>
<fpage>55</fpage>
<lpage>82</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-66492016000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-66492016000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-66492016000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Quine ha promovido una forma de escepticismo sobre los juicios de modalidad de re que cuestiona su función (práctica y teórica) y sugiere, en consecuencia, su eliminación. Wiggins, por su parte, ha argumentado que nuestros juicios ordinarios de individuación de objetos nos comprometen con un cierto esencialismo, con la aceptación de ciertos juicios de modalidad de re. Si Wiggins tuviera razón, tendríamos una respuesta potencial al escepticismo quineano de la función. Sin embargo, en este trabajo argumento que la propuesta de Wiggins es incapaz de proporcionar una respuesta satisfactoria al escepticismo quineano, pues presupone aquello mismo que está en cuestión: los compromisos esencialistas se siguen sólo de la adopción previa de otros juicios de modalidad de re cuya función está precisamente en entredicho. Asimismo, argumento que esta misma conclusión puede extraerse de la consideración de algunas otras teorías contemporáneas de la individuación, similares a la de Wiggins.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: Quine has promoted a form of scepticism about de re modality judgements that calls into question their theoretical and practical role and suggests, on this basis, their elimination. Wiggins, on his part, has argued that our ordinary judgements of individuation of objects commit us to a certain form of essentialism (to making certain judgements of de re modality). If Wiggins were right, we would have a potential answer to Quinean scepticism about function. However, in this paper I argue that Wiggins' proposal cannot provide a satisfactory response to Quinean scepticism, for it presupposes what is under question: commitment to essentialism follows only after the previous adoption of certain judgements of de re modality, whose role is precisely sub judice. In addition, I argue that the same conclusion can be derived from consideration of some other contemporary theories of individuation that are similar to Wiggins'.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Wiggins]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Quine]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escepticismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[juicios de modalidad de re]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Wiggins]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Quine]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[scepticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[de re modality judgements]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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