<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-6266</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Acta universitaria]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Acta univ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-6266</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de Guanajuato, Dirección de Investigación y Posgrado]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-62662017000400083</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.15174/au.2017.1199</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Organizational policy and corruption: the case of the government agencies]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Política organizacional y corrupción: el caso de las agencias de gobierno]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Espinosa-Ramírez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Rafael Salvador]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,rafaelsa@ cucea.udg.mx  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Jalisco]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>27</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<fpage>83</fpage>
<lpage>91</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-62662017000400083&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-62662017000400083&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-62662017000400083&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT Using the principal-agent approach, a theoretical model is developed, in which dishonest government officers lobby authorities (in the form of a corrupted political contribution) for getting some advantage over honest officers. The government agency authority should maximize the welfare of the civil service officers by distributing an economic compensation granted by a central government through the use of an institutional policy. The contribution scheme promotes a relevant truthful equilibrium. A larger institutional level favors honest people; a smaller institutional level favors dishonest people and the bribe they offer. This result has two opposite implications. If government is only an efficient authority, the optimal institutional policy will grant the same amount of economic compensation to all officers. On the other hand, if authority is assuming a moral role against corruption, then the government will be inclined to set the strictest institutional policy.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Usando la Teoría de Agencia-Principal desarrollamos un modelo teórico en el cual burócratas deshonestos cabildean a la autoridad gubernamental (mediante una contribución política) para obtener una ventaja sobre burócratas honestos. La agencia de gobierno debe maximizar el bienestar de los burócratas mediante la distribución de una compensación económica otorgada por el gobierno central mediante el uso de una política institucional. El esquema de contribución ofrecido promueve un equilibrio confiable relevante en política pública. Un nivel institucional alto va beneficiar a los burócratas honestos; un nivel institucional bajo va a beneficiar a los burócratas deshonestos y el soborno ofrecido por ellos. Este resultado tiene dos implicaciones opuestas. Si la autoridad gubernamental es solamente eficiente, entonces la política óptima otorgará la misma compensación económica a todos los burócratas. Alternativamente, si la autoridad gubernamental asume un rol moral contra la corrupción, entonces estará dispuesta a implementar una política institucional más estricta.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Lobby]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[corruption]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political equilibrium]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[institutions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[government agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public policy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Cabildeo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[corrupción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[equilibrio político]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[instituciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agencias de gobierno]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[política pública]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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