<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0186-1042</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Contaduría y administración]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Contad. Adm]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0186-1042</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y Administración]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0186-10422016000200224</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1016/j.cya.2015.05.015</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Determinantes de la concentración de la propiedad empresarial en México]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Determinants of firms' ownership concentration in Mexico]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Watkins Fassler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Karen]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Flores Vargas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diana Rubí]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>61</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>224</fpage>
<lpage>242</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0186-10422016000200224&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0186-10422016000200224&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0186-10422016000200224&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Las empresas no financieras listadas en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores durante el periodo 2001-2012 presentan una alta concentración de la propiedad. Esta no cambia significativamente en el tiempo, excepto considerando períodos normales y de crisis financiera. Mediante un análisis de datos panel se comprueba que dentro de las variables más importantes para explicar la concentración accionaria se encuentran el rendimiento sobre los activos y el porcentaje de directores independientes dentro de las Juntas Directivas. No obstante, la estructura de la propiedad está condicionada también por factores de índole psicológico y cultural, y predomina la influencia del grado de protección a los inversionistas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: High ownership concentration is common for non-financial companies, listed in the Mexican Stock Market during the period 2001-2012. This characteristic does not change considerably in time, except taking into account normal versus financial crisis periods. Through panel data analysis it is possible to determine that two of the most important variables in order to explain ownership concentration are return on assets and the percentage of independent Board members. Nevertheless, ownership structure is also conditioned by psychological and cultural factors, and the degree of investor protection has an important influence on proprietorship.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Concentración de la propiedad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Gobierno corporativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[México]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ownership concentration]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Mexico]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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