<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0185-2450</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Diánoia]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Diánoia]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0185-2450</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0185-24502005000200055</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El Wittgenstein de Kripke y la analogía entre reglas y fundamentos]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez-Torrente]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Mario]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>50</volume>
<numero>55</numero>
<fpage>55</fpage>
<lpage>94</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000200055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Exploro un argumento en defensa del antifactualismo epistémico, la tesis de que las atribuciones epistémicas no describen hechos. El argumento es análogo a, pero independiente de, el argumento del Wittgenstein de Kripke en defensa del antifactualismo acerca de las atribuciones de seguir una regla. Considero y rechazo varias objeciones a los dos argumentos, en particular las acusaciones de incoherencia y &#8220;reductivismo&#8221;. Sostengo que el argumento epistémico y una &#8220;solución escéptica&#8221; suya son parte de la concepción de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certeza.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke&#8217;s Wittgenstein&#8217;s argument for non-factualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and &#8220;reductivism&#8221;. The epistemic argument and a &#8220;skeptical solution&#8221; to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein&#8217;s conception in On Certainty.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conocimiento]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[significado]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escepticismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[antifactualismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[knowledge]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[meaning]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[skepticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[non-factualism]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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