<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0185-2450</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Diánoia]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Diánoia]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0185-2450</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0185-24502005000100055</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Estados mentales, contenidos y conceptos]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stigol]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nora]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>50</volume>
<numero>54</numero>
<fpage>55</fpage>
<lpage>73</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0185-24502005000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este trabajo me propongo presentar el debate entablado hoy en el ámbito de la filosofía de la mente entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas en relación con el contenido de los estados mentales. El debate gira en torno a la existencia de modos no conceptuales de representarse el mundo. El tema que se discute es el carácter no conceptual de los contenidos de cierto tipo de estados mentales. La polémica se plantea principalmente en tres dominios diferentes: el de los estados representacionales en criaturas que carecen de capacidades conceptuales, el de los estados subpersonales de procesamiento de información y el de las experiencias perceptuales. Presento y discuto la noción de contenido no conceptual y su legitimidad en esos tres ámbitos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The aim of this paper is to introduce the present debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists in today&#8217;s philosophy of mind, in relation to the content of mental states. The debate deals with the issue of the existence of non-conceptual modes of representing the world. The subject under discussion is the non-conceptual features of the contents of certain mental states. The polemic is carried on mainly in three different domains: the one of representative states in creatures lacking conceptual abilities; the one of subpersonal states in information processing, and the one of perceptual experiences. I introduce and discuss the non-conceptual content notion and its legitimacy in these three domains.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[representaciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido no conceptual]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[percepción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estados subpersonales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[representation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[non-conceptual content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perception]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[subpersonal states]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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