<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0185-1667</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Investigación económica]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Inv. Econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0185-1667</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Economía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0185-16672025000100117</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/fe.01851667p.2025.331.89288</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[On The Need For Forward-Looking Policymaking: An Ecuadorian Case]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sobre la necesidad de formular políticas previsoramente: un caso ecuatoriano]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez Ramírez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Leopoldo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sánchez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Gonzalo E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Jesuita de Guadalajara Department of Economics, Administration and Marketing ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral Faculty of Social and Human Sciences ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Ecuador</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>84</volume>
<numero>331</numero>
<fpage>117</fpage>
<lpage>141</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0185-16672025000100117&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0185-16672025000100117&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0185-16672025000100117&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT While allowing the refiling of taxes in the case of legitimate mistakes is reasonable, there is empirical evidence showing that the unlimited ability to refile may incentivize evasion. However, theoretical models examining limiting unlimited refilings are nonexistent. Therefore, this paper develops a model to study the role of allowing an unlimited number of tax refilings on the behavior of taxpayers that received tax notifications because they under-reported taxes, as it was seen in the case of Ecuador between 2010 and 2012. Among other things, the key finding of the examination is that, if taxpayers are allowed to refile as many times as they want, the best decision for selfish taxpayers is to evade taxes. Contributing to the tax compliance literature but from a broader perspective as well, this paper demonstrates the importance of considering behavior through careful theoretical analysis before implementing new tax policies.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Si bien es razonable permitir declaraciones sustitutivas de impuestos en caso de errores legítimos, hay evidencia empírica que demuestra que la capacidad ilimitada de hacerlas puede incentivar la evasión. Sin embargo, no existen modelos teóricos que examinen la limitación de las declaraciones sustitutivas ilimitadas. Entonces, este artículo desarrolla un modelo para estudiar el papel de permitir declaraciones sustitutivas de impuestos ilimitadamente sobre el comportamiento de contribuyentes que recibieron notificaciones porque sub-declararon impuestos, como fue el caso en Ecuador entre 2010 y 2012. Entre otros, el hallazgo clave de la investigación es que, si se les permite realizar declaraciones sustitutivas tantas veces como quieran, la mejor decisión para las(os) contribuyentes egoístas es evadir impuestos. Contribuyendo a la literatura sobre el cumplimiento tributario, pero también desde una perspectiva más amplia, este artículo demuestra la importancia de considerar el comportamiento a través de un análisis teórico cuidadoso antes de implementar nuevas políticas tributarias.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Tax compliance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[policy effects]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ecuador]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[C72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H25]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H26]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[K42]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[cumplimiento tributario]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[efectos políticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ecuador]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[C72]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H25]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H26]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[K42]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Allingham]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sandmo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1972</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<numero>3-4</numero>
<issue>3-4</issue>
<page-range>323-38</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alm]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[What motivates tax compliance?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Surveys]]></source>
<year>2019</year>
<volume>33</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>353-88</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alm]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cronshaw]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[McKee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax compliance with endogenous audit selection rules]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Kyklos]]></source>
<year>1993</year>
<volume>46</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>27-45</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Almunia]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lopez-Rodriguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Under the radar: The effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Journal: Economic Policy]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<volume>10</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>1-38</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alstadsaeter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Godar]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nicolaides]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zucman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Global Tax Evasion Report 2024]]></source>
<year>2024</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[EUTax Observatory]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Arrow]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Optimal and voluntary income redistribution]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rosenfield]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson]]></source>
<year>1981</year>
<page-range>267-88</page-range><publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Becker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A theory of social interactions]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1974</year>
<volume>82</volume>
<numero>6</numero>
<issue>6</issue>
<page-range>1063-93</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Blumenthal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Christian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Do normative appeals affect tax compliance? Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>54</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>125-38</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Boadway]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sato]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tremblay]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J-F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Cash-flow business taxation revisited: Bankruptcy and asymmetric information]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Tax and Public Finance]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>922-52</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bowles]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine &#8220;the moral sentiments&#8221;: Evidence from economic experiments]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Science]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>320</volume>
<numero>5883</numero>
<issue>5883</issue>
<page-range>1605-9</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bowles]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Polania-Reyes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Economic incentives and social preferences: Substitutes or complements?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Literature]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<volume>50</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>368-425</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Calonico]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cattaneo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Titiunik]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<volume>82</volume>
<numero>6</numero>
<issue>6</issue>
<page-range>2295-326</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carrillo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pomeranz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Singhal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Dodging the taxman: Firm misreporting and limits to tax enforcement]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Journal: Applied Economics]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<volume>9</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>144-64</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carruthers]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fox]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kessler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Murray]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax compliance in the Amazon]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>297-311</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Does information asymmetry affect corporate tax aggressiveness?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<volume>52</volume>
<numero>5</numero>
<issue>5</issue>
<page-range>2053-81</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cohen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[I.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Technology and the state: Building capacity to tax via text]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2024</year>
<volume>236</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Crocker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Corporate tax evasion with agency costs]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>89</volume>
<numero>9-10</numero>
<issue>9-10</issue>
<page-range>1593-610</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cummings]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Martinez-Vazquez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[McKee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Torgler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>70</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>447-57</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dai]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[X.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wang]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Unintended effects of tax incentives on firms&#8217; strategic patenting]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization]]></source>
<year>2024</year>
<volume>219</volume>
<page-range>1-24</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DeBacker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Heim]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tran]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Yuskavage]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Seeking professional help: How paid preparers decrease tax compliance]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>2024</year>
<volume>77</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>229-61</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[De Paula]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Scheinkman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Value-added taxes, chain effects, and informality]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<volume>2</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>195-221</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dubin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Criminal investigation enforcement activities and taxpayer noncompliance]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Review]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<volume>35</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>500-29</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dubin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Graetz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wilde]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The effect of audit rates on the federal individual income tax, 1977-1986]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>1990</year>
<volume>43</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>395-409</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ellingsen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Johannesson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>98</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>990-1008</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fehr]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schmidt]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism- experimental evidence and new theories]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<page-range>615-91</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fi&#353;ar]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Reggiani]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sabatini]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[&#352;palek]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Media negativity bias and tax compliance: Experimental evidence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Tax and Public Finance]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<page-range>1160-212</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Frey]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Oberholzer-Gee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1997</year>
<volume>87</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>746-55</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Georgellis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Y.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Iossa]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tabvuma]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[V.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Crowding out intrinsic motivation in the public sector]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>21</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>473-93</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gillitzer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Skov]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The use of third-party information reporting for tax deductions: Evidence and implications from charitable deductions in Denmark]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Oxford Economic Papers]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<volume>70</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>892-916</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B30">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gneezy]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[List]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift exchange in labor markets using field experiments]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>74</volume>
<numero>5</numero>
<issue>5</issue>
<page-range>1365-84</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B31">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gneezy]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rustichini]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A fine is a price]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Journal of Legal Studies]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>1-17</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B32">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gneezy]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Meier]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rey-Biel]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[When and why incentives (don&#8217;t) work to modify behavior]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>25</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>191-210</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B33">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Goldin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Homonoff]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Javaid]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schafer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax filing and take-up: Experimental evidence on tax preparation outreach and benefit claiming]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>206</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B34">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Goodman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lim]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sacerdote]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Whitten]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Automated tax filing: Simulating a prepopulated form 1040]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>2023</year>
<volume>76</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>805-38</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B35">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hung]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax evasion and financial development under asymmetric information in credit markets]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Development Economics]]></source>
<year>2020</year>
<volume>145</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B36">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hauck]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wallossek]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Optional (non-) filing and effective taxation]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2024</year>
<volume>238</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B37">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hallsworth]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[List]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Metcalfe]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vlaev]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[I.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<volume>148</volume>
<page-range>14-31</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B38">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Han]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The analysis on Chinese e-commerce tax losses based on the perspective of information asymmetry]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Electronic Commerce Research]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<volume>20</volume>
<page-range>651-77</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B39">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Holz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[List]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zentner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cardoza]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zentner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The $100 million nudge: Increasing tax compliance of firms using a natural field experiment]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2023</year>
<volume>218</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B40">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[John]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Blume]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[How best to nudge taxpayers? The impact of message simplification and descriptive social norms on payment rates in a central London local authority]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Behavioral Public Administration]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>1-11</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B41">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kerr]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vardhan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jindal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Prosocial behavior and incentives: Evidence from field experiments in rural Mexico and Tanzania]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Ecological Economics]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<volume>73</volume>
<page-range>220-7</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B42">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kleven]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Knudsen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kreiner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pedersen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Saez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>79</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>651-92</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B43">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Madrian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Applying insights from behavioral economics to policy design]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Annual Review of Economics]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<volume>6</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>663-88</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B44">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Meiselman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Ghostbusting in Detroit: Evidence on nonfilers from a controlled field experiment]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<volume>158</volume>
<page-range>180-93</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B45">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mittone]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Dynamic behaviour in tax evasion: An experimental approach]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Journal of Socio-Economics]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>35</volume>
<numero>5</numero>
<issue>5</issue>
<page-range>813-35</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B46">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Moulton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Collins]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Loibl]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Haurin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Brown]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Property tax compliance and reverse mortgages: Using nudges to improve the market]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[National Tax Journal]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>33-59</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B47">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mulder]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Van Dijk]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[De Cremer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wilke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Experimental Social Psychology]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>42</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>147-62</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B48">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Muller]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[La composición de la capacidad tributaria: evidencia para un panel de países]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Investigación Económica]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>81</volume>
<numero>319</numero>
<issue>319</issue>
<page-range>63-89</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B49">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<collab>OECD</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Harmful Tax Practices - 2022 Peer Review Reports on the Exchange of Information on Tax Rulings: Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 5]]></source>
<year>2023</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[OECD Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B50">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Samuelson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Altruism as a problem involving group versus individual selection in economics and biology]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1993</year>
<volume>83</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>143-8</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B51">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sánchez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.E.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Non-compliance notifications and taxpayer strategic behaviour: Evidence from Ecuador]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Tax Public Finance]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<page-range>627-66</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B52">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Moral codes and economic success]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Brittan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hamlin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Market Capitalism and Moral Values]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<page-range>29-34</page-range><publisher-name><![CDATA[Edward Elgar]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B53">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax compliance and enforcement]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Literature]]></source>
<year>2019</year>
<volume>57</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>904-54</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B54">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Collins]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hoopes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Reck]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sebastiani]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Does credit-card information reporting improve small-business tax compliance?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<volume>149</volume>
<page-range>1-19</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B55">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Smith]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Theory of Moral Sentiments]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Penguin]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B56">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>The CORE Team</collab>
<source><![CDATA[The Economy]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B57">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Weaver]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Getting people to behave: Research lessons for policy makers]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Public Administration Review]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>6</numero>
<issue>6</issue>
<page-range>806-16</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B58">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Yang]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Can enforcement backfire? Crime displacement in the context of customs reform in the Philippines]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Review of Economics and Statistics]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>90</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>1-14</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
