<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0185-1667</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Investigación económica]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Inv. Econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0185-1667</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Economía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0185-16672018000300097</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/fe.01851667p.2018.305.67485</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A game-theoretic approach to the choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Un enfoque de teoría de juegos para la selección de la agenda de negociación del oligopolio sindical]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Buccella]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Domenico]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fanti]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Luciano]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Kozminski University  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Poland</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Pisa  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Italy</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>77</volume>
<numero>305</numero>
<fpage>97</fpage>
<lpage>120</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0185-16672018000300097&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0185-16672018000300097&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0185-16672018000300097&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper investigates the selection of the bargaining agenda in a unionized industry with decentralized negotiations for different competition modes. The firms choose the agenda (right-to-manage, RTM, versus efficient bargaining, EB), considering alternative timing of the bargaining game in the case of mixed duopoly. In fact, the EB (RTM) firm can be either Stackelberg wage follower (leader) or Stackelberg output leader (follower). A two-stage game is developed in which the typology as well as the timing of the negotiations is endogenous. It is shown that, in pure strategies, no equilibria arise for a wide set of the parameters&#8217; space while RTM appears as the unique equilibrium agenda for a different combination of the parameters; moreover, multiple, asymmetric equilibria emerge in a limited area of the parameters&#8217; space. These results are in sharp contrast to the received literature in which EB can arise as an industry bargaining institution in equilibrium.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo investiga la selección de la agenda de negociación en una industria sindicalizada con negociaciones descentralizadas para diferentes modos de competencia. Las empresas eligen la agenda (negociación con derecho de administrar, NDA, frente a negociación eficiente, NE) considerando casos alternativos de la sucesión de eventos en el juego de negociación con duopolio mixto. De hecho, la empresa NE (NDA) puede ser seguidora de salarios Stackelberg (líder) o líder de cantidades Stackelberg (seguidora). Se desarrolla un juego de dos etapas en el que la tipología y el momento de las negociaciones son endógenos. Se muestra que en estrategias puras no surgen equilibrios para un amplio conjunto del espacio de los parámetros, mientras que NDA aparece como la agenda de equilibrio única para una combinación diferente de los parámetros; además, los equilibrios múltiples y asimétricos emergen en un área limitada del espacio de los parámetros. Estos resultados contrastan con la literatura existente, en la que NE puede surgir como una institución de negociación de la industria en equilibrio.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Efficient bargaining]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[right-to-manage]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[union-oligopoly bargaining agenda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[negociación eficiente]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[negociación con derecho de administrar]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agenda de negociación del oligopolio sindical]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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