<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032025000200131</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1702</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Measures without Measurement: A Critique of Ruffino&#8217;s Institutional Approach to the Contingent A Priori]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Medidas sin medición: una crítica al enfoque institucional de Ruffino sobre lo a priori contingente]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Boccardi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Emiliano]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Brazil</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>57</volume>
<numero>170</numero>
<fpage>131</fpage>
<lpage>143</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200131&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200131&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200131&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary: This paper presents three objections to Marco Ruffino&#8217;s account of contingent a priori truths. First, I argue that Ruffino&#8217;s &#8220;Philonous&#8217; Objection&#8221; neglects what is widely considered the mark of perception-namely, perceptual constancies, which allow stable representations despite variable sensory input. Second, I show that Ruffino&#8217;s institutional approach to the contingent a priori faces challenges under both relational (ratio-based) and monadic (property-ascribing) interpretations of measurement statements: the former diminishes the need for stipulation, while the latter risks conflating stipulative acts with empirical measurement outcomes. Third, I contend that Ruffino&#8217;s account risks an unwarranted commitment to social constructivism about brute physical facts.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Este artículo presenta tres objeciones a la teoría de las verdades contingentes a priori de Marco Ruffino. En primer lugar, argumento que la &#8220;objeción de Filonús&#8221; que plantea Ruffino ignora lo que se considera ampliamente el rasgo distintivo de la percepción: las constancias perceptivas, las cuales permiten formar representaciones estables pese a las variaciones en la información sensorial. En segundo lugar, muestro que la concepción institucional de Ruffino de lo contingente a priori se enfrenta a desafíos según las interpretaciones relacionales (basadas en proporciones) como las monádicas (que atribuyen propiedades) de los enunciados de medición: la primera pone en tela de juicio la necesidad de estipulación, mientras que la segunda corre el riesgo de confundir los actos estipulativos con los resultados de la medición empírica. En tercer lugar, sostengo que la explicación de Ruffino corre el riesgo de comprometerse, sin justificación alguna, con un constructivismo social de los hechos físicos brutos.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perceptual acquaintance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[institutional facts]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[measurement standards]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perceptual constancies]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[speech acts]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[percepción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[hechos institucionales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estándares de medición]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[constancias perceptivas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[actos de habla.]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Austin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[How to Do Things with Words]]></source>
<year>1962</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Berkeley]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[George]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous]]></source>
<year>1713</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[London ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Jacob Tonson]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Burge]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Tyler]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Cognition through Understanding]]></source>
<year>2021</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Burge]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Tyler]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Origins of Objectivity]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Burge]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Tyler]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Foundations of Mind]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dicker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Georges]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Berkeley&#8217;s Idealism: A Critical Examination]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Donnellan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Keith S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;Reference and Definite Descriptions&#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Philosophical Review]]></source>
<year>1966</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>281-304</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kant]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Immanuel]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guyer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Paul]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wood]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Critique of Pure Reason]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kripke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Saul A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Naming and Necessity]]></source>
<year>1972</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass. ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Michell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Joel]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;The Logic of Measurement: A Realist Overview&#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Measurement]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>38</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>285-94</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Michell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Joel]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;Further Thoughts on Realism, Representationalism, and the Foundations of Measurement &#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Mathematical Psychology]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<volume>39</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>243-7</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Michell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Joel]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;Numbers as Quantitative Relations and the Traditional Theory ofMeasurement &#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[British Journal for the Philosophy of Science]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<volume>45</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>389-406</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Michell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Joel]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;The Origins of the Representational Theory of Measurement : Helmholtz, Hölder, and Russell&#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Studies in History and Philosophy of Science]]></source>
<year>1993</year>
<volume>24</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>185-206</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Peacocke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Christopher]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject&#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Revue Internationale de Philosophie]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>62</volume>
<numero>244</numero>
<issue>244</issue>
<page-range>7-24</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Plantinga]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Alvin]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Nature of Necessity]]></source>
<year>1974</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[New York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ross]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Helen E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Plug]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Cornelis]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;The History of Size Constancy and Size Illusions&#8221;]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walsh]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Vincent]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kulikowski]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Janusz]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Perceptual Constancy: Why Things Look as They Do]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>499-528</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Salmon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nathan]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[&#8220;How to Measure the Standard Meter&#8221;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II]]></source>
<year>1987</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass. ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[MIT Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Salmon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nathan]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Frege&#8217;s Puzzle]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass. ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[MIT Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Searle]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[John R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vanderveken]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Daniel]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Foundations of Illocutionary Logic]]></source>
<year>1985</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
