<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032025000200065</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1692</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A naturalistic analysis of content ascriptions]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Un análisis naturalista de las adscripciones de contenido]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Withrington]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Esteban]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Filosó&#64257;cas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>57</volume>
<numero>170</numero>
<fpage>65</fpage>
<lpage>97</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200065&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200065&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200065&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary: I articulate and defend an analysis of true content ascriptions proposed by Devitt, according to which they predicate worldly semantic properties instead of involving relations to abstract propositions. I develop the metaphysical case against treating contents as abstract propositions, addressing possible replies to Devitt&#8217;s argument based on the causal-explanatory roles of contents and offering further considerations. I explain how the Devittian analysis of content ascriptions can account for the validity of certain inferences often thought to require a propositional analysis. Finally, I argue that it also circumvents linguistic problems faced by the standard propositional analysis of ascriptions and offers a plausible alternative for capturing their logical form and meaning.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Articulo y de&#64257;endo un análisis de adscripciones de contenido verdaderas propuesto por Devitt, según el cual éstas predican propiedades semánticas mundanas en lugar de involucrar relaciones con proposiciones abstractas. Desarrollo el caso metafísico contra la idea de tratar los contenidos como proposiciones abstractas, abordando posibles respuestas al argumento de Devitt basado en los roles causal- explicativos de los contenidos y ofreciendo consideraciones adicionales. Explico cómo el análisis devittiano de las adscripciones de contenido puede dar cuenta de la validez de ciertas inferencias que a menudo se considera que requieren un análisis proposicional. Por último, sostengo que también evita problemas lingüísticos a los que se enfrenta el análisis proposicional estándar de las adscripciones y constituye una alternativa plausible para captar su forma lógica y su signi&#64257;cado.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[attitude reports]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Michael Devitt]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[propositions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[causal role of content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[naturalistic metaphysics]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reportes de actitudes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Michael Devitt]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[proposiciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[rol causal del contenido]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[metafísica naturalista]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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