<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032025000200005</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1691</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Superafirmabilidad, justificación, y los retos de una verdad antirrealista]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Superassertability, Justification, and the Challenges of an Anti-Realist Truth]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Torices Degollado]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Guillermo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>57</volume>
<numero>170</numero>
<fpage>5</fpage>
<lpage>32</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032025000200005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: La superafirmabilidad (SA) pretende ser una noción antirrealista de verdad en discursos como lo cómico, lo moral y lo social, donde la verdad depende de los juicios de los sujetos. Su éxito radica en que una justificación incrementada puede ser estable: una afirmación seguiría estando justificada pese a la aparición de nueva información. No obstante, SA enfrenta dificultades para alcanzar esa estabilidad debido a una concepción antirrealista restringida del acceso a la evidencia. Propongo reinterpretar la estabilidad mediante una confianza epistémica: un compromiso normativo y práctico que subyace a cualquier acto de afirmación. Cuando alguien afirma p, no solo reconoce la evidencia, sino que asume también racionalmente que la justificación perdurará salvo contraevidencia legítima.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary: Superassertibility (SA) aims to be an anti-realist notion of truth in discourses such as the comic, the moral, and the social, where truth depends on subjects&#8217; judgments. Its success lies in that an increased justification can be stable: an assertion would remain justified despite the emergence of new information. Yet, SA faces difficulties in achieving such stability due to a restricted anti-realist conception of access to evidence. I propose to reinterpret stability through epistemic trust: a normative and practical commitment underlying any act of assertion. When someone asserts p, they not only recognize the evidence but also rationally assume that justification will persist unless legitimate counterevidence arises.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[antirrealismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normatividad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[verdad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[confianza]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evidencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[anti-realism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[normativity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[truth]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[trust]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[evidence]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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