<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032022000100057</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.l8704905e.2022.1310</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El problema de la representación: ¿razonamientos subrogantes válidos o sólidos?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Accorinti]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Hernán Lucas]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>54</volume>
<numero>160</numero>
<fpage>57</fpage>
<lpage>81</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032022000100057&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032022000100057&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032022000100057&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En el presente trabajo intentaré poner de manifiesto las debilidades de los argumentos dados por Contessa para sustentar, como fuente del representar, a los razonamientos subrogantes (RS) válidos por sobre los sólidos. En primer lugar, analizo ciertas ventajas epistémicas del criterio sustentado sobre los RS sólidos, evidenciando, consecuentemente, los límites del criterio estipulado por Contessa. En segundo lugar, muestro que los argumentos utilizados por Contessa para descartar el criterio instituido en los RS sólidos son deficientes, ya que, en el mejor de los casos, no demuestran nada y, en el peor de los casos, o bien se comete una falacia por ambigüedad o bien se comete una petición de principio.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary In this article, I will try to provide good reasons that show the weakness of the arguments given by Contessa to support valid surrogate reasoning (SR) over solid ones as a source of representing. Firstly, I will analyze certain epistemic advantages of the criterion supported by solid SR, showing the limits of the criterion stipulated by Contessa. Secondly, I will show that the arguments given by Contessa to dismiss solid SR criteria are deficient since, at best, they do not demonstrate anything and, at worst, they either commit an ambiguity fallacy or a petitio principii.]]></p></abstract>
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<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[modelos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[representación científica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Contessa]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[concepción inferencial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[verdad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[models]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[scientific representation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Contessa]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[inferential conception]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[truth]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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