<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032018000100003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.01</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Fully Understanding Concept Possession]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Verdejo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Víctor M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universitat de Barcelona Logos Research Group ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>50</volume>
<numero>148</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>27</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke&#8217;s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen ¿Pueden las personas poseer conceptos que no comprenden completamente? Un argumento simple muestra que, si las condiciones de posesión individúan conceptos totalmente, la respuesta a esta cuestión es negativa. En este artículo, examino esta respuesta con base en una posible articulación de la teoría de Christopher Peacocke y presento cuatro líneas centrales de ataque a la idea de que la posesión de conceptos requiere compresión completa. Concluyo que debemos reconocer la existencia de un número ilimitado de casos de posesión genuina de conceptos parcialmente comprendidos y así afrontar el reto de la determinación, esto es, el reto de determinar totalmente la individuación de conceptos a partir de condiciones de posesión de conceptos parcialmente comprendidos.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[partial understanding]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[concept individuation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[implicit conceptions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[anti-individualism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[determination challenge]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[comprensión parcial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[individuación de conceptos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[concepción implícita]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[antiindividualismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reto de la determinación]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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