<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032017000300075</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Detached statements]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[McBride]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Mark]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,National University of Singapore Faculty of Law ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Singapur</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>49</volume>
<numero>147</numero>
<fpage>75</fpage>
<lpage>89</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT Joseph Raz has introduced an interesting class of statements -detached statements- into the philosophical lexicon. In brief, such statements are (informative) normative statements, yet the speaker does not, in so uttering them, express or convey acceptance of the point of view of the hearer to whom they are addressed (as contrasted with committed statements, where the speaker does express or convey such acceptance). I propose to offer a novel analysis of such statements (and to clear away some confusions about them). In brief, such statements will be analysed as wide-scope normative conditionals.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Joseph Raz ha introducido en el léxico filosófico una clase interesante de enunciados: los enunciados no comprometidos. Dicho de forma breve, éstos son enunciados normativos (informativos); sin embargo, al proferirlos, el hablante no expresa aceptación del punto de vista de la persona a la que están dirigidos (a diferencia de los enunciados comprometidos, en los que el hablante sí expresa tal aceptación). Propongo ofrecer un análisis original de esos enunciados (y deshacer algunas confusiones sobre ellos). En resumen, esos enunciados se analizarán como condicionales normativos de alcance amplio.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Joseph Raz]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[normative statements]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[committed statements]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[wide-scope normative conditionals]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Joseph Raz]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[enunciados normativos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[enunciados comprometidos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[condicionales normativos de alcance amplio]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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