<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032017000300041</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Down the methodological rabbit hole]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Frydrych]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[David]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,National University of Singapore Faculty of Law ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Singapur</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>49</volume>
<numero>147</numero>
<fpage>41</fpage>
<lpage>73</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300041&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT This article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample&#8217;s impact. Section 4 explains &#8220;metatheoretical&#8221; desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably &#8220;normative&#8221; enterprise. It argues that certain &#8220;normativist&#8221; methodologies, such as Dworkin&#8217;s constructive interpretation and Finnis&#8217; appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Este artículo revisa cuestiones metodológicas que han guiado, moldeado y plagado las discusiones de la filosofía analítica del derecho. Explica brevemente los conceptos de análisis conceptual, definiciones analíticas y parecidos de familia, y sostiene que los casos centrales se usan de más de una manera. Presenta críticas a esos conceptos y métodos, cuyos defectos se deben a la falta de un paradigma común acerca del impacto de los contraejemplos. Explica sucintamente desiderata &#8220;metateóricos&#8221; y sostiene que, hasta la fecha, recurrir a estas normas no ha sido de tanta ayuda para la filosofía del derecho como algunos sugieren. Finalmente, el texto vuelve a la selección de conceptos preguntándose si la teorización legal es una empresa invariablemente &#8220;normativa&#8221;, y concluye que ciertas metodologías &#8220;normativistas&#8221;, como la interpretación constructivista de Dworkin o la invocación al caso central del punto de vista interno de Finnis, son innecesarias.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[conceptual analysis]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[central cases]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[counterexamples]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[meta-theoretical desiderata]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal philosophical methodology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[análisis conceptual]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[casos centrales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contraejemplos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desiderata metateóricos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[metodología de la filosofía del derecho]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Baker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hacker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.M.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Volume 1 An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Part I - Essays]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Wiley-Blackwell]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Barber]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Oxford Journal of Legal Studies]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>35</volume>
<page-range>799-823</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bayles]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Hart&#8217;s Legal Philosophy: An Examination]]></source>
<year>1992</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Dordrecht ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Kluwer Academic Publishers]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Baz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Ordinary Linguistic Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>112-29</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bix]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Raz on Necessity]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Law and Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<volume>22</volume>
<page-range>537-59</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Booth]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Booth]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rowbottom]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Introduction]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<page-range>1-8</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Booth]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rowbottom]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Intuitions]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology]]></source>
<year></year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carnap]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic]]></source>
<year>1956</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Chicago ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[The University of Chicago Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cath]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Y.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Reflective Equilibrium]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>213-30</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coleman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Methodology]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coleman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapiro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coleman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Incorporation, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Legal Theory]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>4</volume>
<page-range>381-425</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coyle]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Are There Necessary Truths About Rights?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<volume>15</volume>
<page-range>21-49</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cummins]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>113-28</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dagger]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rights]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ball]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Political Innovation and Conceptual Change]]></source>
<year>1989</year>
<page-range>292-308</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Daly]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[An Introduction to Philosophical Methods]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Toronto ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Broadview Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Daniels]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Reflective Equilibrium]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zalta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium?]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>293-310</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Lanham ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Rowman and Littlefield]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dickson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Law and Its Theory]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Keown]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[George]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dickson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Evaluation and Legal Theory]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Hart Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Duke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Aristotelian Spoudaios as Ethical Exemplar in Finnis&#8217; Natural Law Theory]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Journal of Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<volume>58</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>183-204</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dworkin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Law&#8217;s Empire]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass. ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Enoch]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Plunkett]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapiro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Toh]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year></year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Farrell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[I.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Texas Law Review]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>84</volume>
<page-range>983-1011</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Finnis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Natural Law and Natural Rights]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Finnis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Law and What I Truly Should Decide]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Journal of Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<volume>48</volume>
<page-range>107-29</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Frydrych]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rights Modelling]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<volume>30</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>125-57</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gardner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<page-range>19-53</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B30">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Giudice]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Understanding the Nature of Law: A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cheltenham ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Elgar Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B31">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Giudice]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Analytic Jurisprudence and Contingency]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Del Mar]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[New Waves in Philosophy of Law]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<page-range>58-76</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Basingstoke ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Palgrave Macmillan]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B32">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Graham]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hogan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>271-92</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B33">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Grice]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Strawson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[In Defence of a Dogma]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Philosophical Review]]></source>
<year>1956</year>
<volume>65</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>141-58</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B34">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gupta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Definitions]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zalta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B35">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gutting]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[&#8216;Rethinking Intuition&#8217;: A Historical and Metaphilosophical Introduction]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>3-14</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B36">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hacker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.M.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: On Quine&#8217;s Culde-sac]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Wittgenstein: Comparisons and Context]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<page-range>187-208</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B37">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Halpin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Methodology]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Patterson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<page-range>607-20</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Wiley-Blackwell]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B38">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Halpin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Rights and Law: Analysis and Theory]]></source>
<year>1997</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Hart Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B39">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harmon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Doubts about Conceptual Analysis]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind]]></source>
<year>1999</year>
<page-range>138-43</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B40">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hart]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.L.A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Concept of Law]]></source>
<year>1997</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B41">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hart]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.L.A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<page-range>21-48</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B42">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hart]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.L.A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal Rights]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory]]></source>
<year>1982</year>
<page-range>162-93</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B43">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Himma]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Conceptual Jurisprudence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>26</volume>
<page-range>65-92</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B44">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Himma]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Law&#8217;s Claim of Legitimate Authority]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coleman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Hart&#8217;s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<page-range>271-309</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B45">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hohfeld]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Yale Law Journal]]></source>
<year>1913</year>
<volume>23</volume>
<page-range>16-59</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B46">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Honoré]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Ownership]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guest]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>1961</year>
<page-range>107-47</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B47">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Huemer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Daly]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<page-range>51-76</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Basingstoke ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Palgrave Macmillan]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B48">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jackson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Role of Conceptual Analysis]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<page-range>28-55</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B49">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jenkins]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Booth]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rowbottom]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Intuition, &#8216;Intuition&#8217;, Concepts and the A Priori]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<page-range>91-118</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B50">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[King]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>249-61</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B51">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kramer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal and Moral Obligation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Golding]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Edmundson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<page-range>179-90</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Blackwell]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B52">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kramer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Requirements, Reasons, and Raz: Legal Positivism and Legal Duties]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Ethics]]></source>
<year>1999</year>
<volume>109</volume>
<page-range>375-407</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B53">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kramer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Steiner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Oxford Journal of Legal Studies]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<volume>27</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>281-310</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B54">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Langlinais]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Leiter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Methodology of Legal Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>671-90</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B55">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Laurence]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Margolis]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Concepts]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zalta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B56">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Leiter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Naturalism in Legal Philosophy]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zalta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B57">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Leiter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Naturalized Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism Revisited]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Law and Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>30</volume>
<page-range>499-516</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B58">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Leiter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Explaining Theoretical Disagreement]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[University of Chicago Law Review]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>76</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>1215-50</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B59">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Leiter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B60">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[MacCormick]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Children&#8217;s Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Rights]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy]]></source>
<year>1982</year>
<page-range>154-66</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B61">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[MacCormick]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rights in Legislation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hacker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.M.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart]]></source>
<year>1977</year>
<page-range>189-209</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B62">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marmor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waluchow]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sciaraffa]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence)]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<page-range>209-29</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B63">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Patterson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Ratio Juris]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<volume>25</volume>
<page-range>47-58</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B64">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Plunkett]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and the Methodology of Philosophy]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Inquiry]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>58</volume>
<page-range>828-74</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B65">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pound]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Legal Rights]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>1959</year>
<volume>4</volume>
<page-range>41-90</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[St. Paul ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[West Publishing]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B66">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Priel]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Jurisprudence and Necessity]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<volume>20</volume>
<page-range>173-200</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B67">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Putnam]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Analytic and the Synthetic]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers]]></source>
<year>1979</year>
<volume>2</volume>
<page-range>33-69</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B68">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Quine]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.V.O.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Philosophical Review]]></source>
<year>1951</year>
<volume>60</volume>
<page-range>20-43</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B69">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>161-78</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B70">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B71">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B72">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Practical Reason and Norms]]></source>
<year>1999</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B73">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Ethics in the Public Domain]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B74">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Raz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Morality of Freedom]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B75">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rosen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Real Definition]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Analytic Philosophy]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<volume>56</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>189-209</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B76">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schauer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[On the Nature of the Nature of Law]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Archiv Für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<volume>98</volume>
<page-range>457-67</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B77">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapiro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Legality]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass. ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B78">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stitch]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[DePaul]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ramsey]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<page-range>95-112</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B79">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stoljar]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waluchow]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sciaraffa]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<page-range>230-56</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B80">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sumner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Moral Foundations of Rights]]></source>
<year>1987</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Clarendon Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B81">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tamanaha]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Mounting Challenge to Assertions about &#8216;The Nature of Law&#8217;]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B82">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tamanaha]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B83">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waluchow]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sciaraffa]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B84">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Weatherson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[What Good Are Counterexamples?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<volume>115</volume>
<page-range>1-31</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B85">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Weinberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cappelen]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gendler]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hawthorne]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Intuitions]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>287-308</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B86">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[White]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Conceptual Analysis]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bontempo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Odell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Owl of Minerva: Philosophers on Philosophy]]></source>
<year>1975</year>
<page-range>103-17</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[New York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[McGraw-Hill]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B87">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wittgenstein]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Anscombe]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.E.M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hacker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.M.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schulte]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Philosophical Investigations]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<edition>4</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Wiley-Blackwell]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
