<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032017000300011</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Why general jurisprudence is interesting]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dickson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Julie]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Oxford Faculty of Law ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>United Kingdom</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>49</volume>
<numero>147</numero>
<fpage>11</fpage>
<lpage>39</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300011&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300011&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000300011&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT In a recent article entitled, &#8220;Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?&#8221;, David Enoch answers his own question resoundingly in the negative. This article critically examines the character of Enoch&#8217;s claim, the presuppositions it rests on, and the way in which he seeks to establish it. Having argued that many of Enoch&#8217;s views in this regard hinge on a narrow and idiosyncratic understanding of the questions that general jurisprudence addresses, and of the relations between those questions and many other inquiries concerning the character of law, the article concludes by offering its author&#8217;s own vision of what makes general jurisprudence engaging, intriguing, and. . . well. . . interesting.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN En un artículo reciente titulado &#8220;Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?&#8221;, David Enoch responde su propia pregunta de forma sonoramente negativa. Este artículo examina críticamente la naturaleza de la afirmación de Enoch, las presuposiciones sobre las que descansa y la manera en la que intenta mostrar que tal es el caso. Habiendo argüido que muchas de las visiones al respecto dependen de un entendimiento pobre e idiosincrásico de las cuestiones de las que se ocupa la teoría general del derecho, así como de las relaciones entre esas cuestiones y muchas otras investigaciones acerca de la naturaleza del derecho, el artículo concluye ofreciendo la propia versión de la autora acerca de aquello que hace de la teoría general del derecho algo intrigante, cautivador y. . . también. . . interesante.]]></p></abstract>
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<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[filosofía del derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[metodología]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[filosofía del derecho indirectamente evaluativa]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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