<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032017000200075</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin&#8217;s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Villa Rosas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Gonzalo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Germany</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>49</volume>
<numero>146</numero>
<fpage>75</fpage>
<lpage>105</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200075&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[SUMMARY This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin&#8217;s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power- conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal power- conferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Este artículo tiene como objetivo explorar dos objeciones planteadas en contra del segundo enfoque defendido por Bulygin en relación con la definición de la naturaleza de las reglas jurídicas que otorgan competencia jurídica. Según la primera, tal enfoque es vago en cuanto a lo que estas reglas jurídicas definen. Esta vaguedad se debe a la falta de una definición adecuada de la competencia jurídica. Defenderé la reducción de la complejidad de definientia definiendo la competencia jurídica como una especie de competencia en sentido general. Según la segunda, este enfoque no reduccionista no puede explicar la normatividad de este tipo de reglas. Contra este enfoque, sostendré que las reglas jurídicas que otorgan competencia desempeñan tanto una función deóntica como una función definitoria en cuanto reglas constitutivas de la práctica jurídica.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H.L.A. Hart]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[competence]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[practices]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[presupposition]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[practical and theoretical points of view of rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H.L.A. Hart]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[competencia jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prácticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[presuposición]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[perspectiva teórica y perspectiva práctica de las reglas]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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