<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032017000200037</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.180</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sebastián]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Miguel Ángel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>49</volume>
<numero>146</numero>
<fpage>37</fpage>
<lpage>60</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032017000200037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN En un artículo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relación ampliamente aceptada en epistemología entre creencia y conocimiento. Además, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestión o bien involucra una noción de consciencia no relevante para la discusión.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[SUMMARY In a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal&#8217;s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal&#8217;s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[consciencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[representación de se]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teorías de pensamiento de orden superior]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[creencia inconsciente]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[referencia de primera persona]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[consciousness]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[de se representation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[higher-order thought theories]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[unconscious belief]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[first-person reference]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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