<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032016000100003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.234</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Vindicating chance: on the reductionism/non-reductionism debate]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Caso]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ramiro]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires Facultad de Filosofía y Letras Departamento de Filosofía]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>48</volume>
<numero>142</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>33</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance is presented, and the dialectical burdens acquired by each side of the debate are identified: the motivation problem and the explanation problem. It is argued that, while the motivation problem presents no challenge to non-reductionists, reductionists are unable successfully to answer it. Contrary to what has been suggested, both sides share the burden of the explanation problem. It is argued that non-reductionists can successfully answer it, whereas reductionists are unable to make the corresponding claim. Hence, the non-reductionist side has an important dialectical advantage.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Se presenta el debate entre reduccionismo y no reduccionismo respecto de la probabilidad objetiva y se identifican las cargas dialécticas adquiridas por cada posición: el problema de la motivación y el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que, mientras que el problema de la motivación no presenta ningún desafío para los no reduccionistas, los reduccionistas no son capaces de responderlo exitosamente. Contrariamente a lo que se ha sugerido, ambos lados comparten el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que los no reduccionistas pueden responderlo exitosamente, mientras que los reduccionistas no son capaces de hacerlo. Por lo tanto, el lado no reduccionista tiene una ventaja dialéctica importante.]]></p></abstract>
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<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Humean supervenience]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Big Bad Bug]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Principal Principle]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[credencechance norms]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[open future]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[superveniencia humeana]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[big bad bug]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[principio principal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normas de grados de creencia-probabilidad objetiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[futuro abierto]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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