<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032015000300003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2015.386</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Conscious thought and the limits of restrictivism]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jorba]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Marta]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Girona Department of Philosophy ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>47</volume>
<numero>141</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>32</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032015000300003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032015000300003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032015000300003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On the one hand, I problematize the role of attention adopted by sensory restrictivism and I present and discuss in detail an argument that defends the limitation of sensory phenomenology so as to explain the distinction between visual and cognitive mental episodes on the basis of immediate experience. On the other hand, I address accompanying states views by discussing the empirical studies of Hurlburt et al. (2006, 2008) that defend the existence of &#8220;unsymbolized thinking&#8221;. I present how they can be construed as evidence for cognitive phenomenology views and I dispel some problems that have been raised against its acceptance. I thus conclude that cognitive phenomenology views hold up well against the restrictivist positions considered.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen ¿Como debemos caracterizar la naturaleza del pensamiento consciente ocurrente? Recientemente en filosofía de la mente ha surgido un tema muy poco explorado: la fenomenología cognitiva o el carácter fenoménico de los episodios mentales cognitivos. En este artículo presento en primer lugar la motivación de los defensores de la fenomenología cognitiva a través de casos de contraste fenoménico que se pueden considerar un reto para sus oponentes. En segundo lugar exploro la posición en contra de la fenomenología cognitiva que el restrictivismo defiende clasificándolo en dos estrategias: restrictivismo sensorial y estados acompañantes. Por un lado problematizo el papel de la atención que adopta el restrictivismo sensorial y presento y discuto en detalle un argumento que defiende los límites de la fenomenología sensorial para explicar la distinción entre los episodios visuales y cognitivos sobre la base de la experiencia inmediata. Por otro, discuto la estrategia de estados acompañantes a través de los estudios empíricos de Hurlburt et al. (2006, 2008) que defienden la existencia del &#8220;pensamiento no simbólico&#8221;. Muestro como estos estudios pueden ser evidencia para la fenomenología cognitiva y disipo algunos problemas que se han planteado contra su aceptación. Concluyo finalmente que los defensores de la fenomenología cognitiva se encuentran en una buena posición frente a las visiones restrictivistas consideradas.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cognitive phenomenology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sensory phenomenology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[phenomenal consciousness]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[experience]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[unsymbolized thinking]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fenomenología cognitiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fenomenología sensorial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conciencia fenoménica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[experiencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[pensamiento no simbólico]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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