<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032014000200085</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Encuentros cercanos con argumentos del &#8220;tercer tipo&#8221;: razonamiento plausible y probabilidad subjetiva como modelos de evaluación de argumentos]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gaviria]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Christian]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jiménez-Leal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[William]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de los Andes Departamento de Psicología ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de los Andes Departamento de Psicología ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2014</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2014</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>46</volume>
<numero>137</numero>
<fpage>85</fpage>
<lpage>112</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000200085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000200085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000200085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo presenta un análisis comparativo de los modelos de argumentación basados en las nociones de probabilidad subjetiva y de razonamiento plausible. Se hacen explícitos los &#8220;parecidos de familia&#8221; entre probabilidad y plausibilidad, y se examinan las diferencias en las prescripciones invocadas para la evaluación de tres tipos de falacias informales: apelación a la autoridad (ad verecundiam), a la popularidad (ad populum) y petición de principio (petitio principii). Se concluye que el razonamiento plausible, como Rescher y Walton lo describen, no proporciona una alternativa sólida a la probabilidad como modelo normativo o descriptivo de la evaluación de argumentos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary This paper presents a comparative analysis of argumentation models based on the concepts of subjective probability and plausible reasoning. This analysis makes explicit the &#8220;family resemblance&#8221; between subjective probability and plausible reasoning, while examining the differences in the requirements that each model invokes regarding the evaluation of three types of informal fallacies: argument from authority (ad verecundiam), appeal to popularity (ad populum) and begging the question (petitio principii). We conclude that plausible reasoning, as it is characterized by Rescher and Walton, does not provide a strong alternative to probability as a either a normative or descriptive model of argument evaluation.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lógica informal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[falacias]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Bayes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[argumentación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[ciencia cognitiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[informal logic]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[fallacies]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Bayes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[argumentation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cognitive science]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aristóteles]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Calvo Martínez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Metafísica]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Madrid ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Gredos]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aristóteles]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Candel Sanmartín]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Tratados de Lógica (Órganon)]]></source>
<year>1988</year>
<volume>II</volume>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Madrid ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Gredos]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aristóteles]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Candel Sanmartín]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Tratados de Lógica (Órganon)]]></source>
<year>1982</year>
<volume>I</volume>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Madrid ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Gredos]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Blair]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Dordrecht ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Springer]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chater]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Oaksford]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Oxford, Reino Unido ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Copi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[I.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cohen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Introducción a la lógica]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[México ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Limusa]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Corner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better than Others?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Synthese]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<volume>190</volume>
<numero>16</numero>
<issue>16</issue>
<page-range>3579-610</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Corner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Oaksford]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Psychological Mechanism of the Slippery Slope Argument]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Memory y Language]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>64</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>133-52</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gaviria]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jiménez-Leal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Coherence and Argument Structure: An Empirical Comparison between Plausible Reasoning and the Bayesian Approach to Argumentation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bello]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guarini]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[McShane]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Scassellati]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society]]></source>
<year></year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Austin, Texas ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cognitive Science Society]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Griffiths]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chater]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kemp]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Perfors]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tenembaum]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Probabilistic Models of Cognition: Exploring Representations and Inductive Biases]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Trends in Cognitive Sciences]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<volume>14</volume>
<numero>8</numero>
<issue>8</issue>
<page-range>357-64</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harris]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Corner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Informal Logic]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>337-67</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Oaksford]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rational Argument]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Holyoak]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Morrison]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Nueva York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Psychological Review]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<volume>114</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>704-32</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A Normative Theory of Argument Strength]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Informal Logic]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>26</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>1-22</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Oaksford]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harris]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Testimony and Argument: A Bayesian Perspective]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zenker]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Bayesian Argumentation]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Dordrecht ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Springer]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hanson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Observación y explicación: guía de la filosofía de la ciencia; Patrones de descubrimiento: investigación de las bases conceptuales de la ciencia]]></source>
<year>1971</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Madrid ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Alianza]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harris]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Bayesian Rationality in Evaluating Multiple Testimonies: Incorporating the Role of Coherence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>35</volume>
<page-range>1366-72</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harris]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hsu]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Madsen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Because Hitler Did It! Quantitative Tests of Bayesian Argumentation Using &#8216;ad hominem&#8217;]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Thinking and Reasoning]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<volume>18</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>311-43</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lipton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Inference to the Best Explanation]]></source>
<year>2004</year>
<edition>2a. ed.</edition>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Londres ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Routledge]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pearl]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference]]></source>
<year>1988</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[San Mateo, California ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Morgan Kauffman Publishers]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pinto]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Weighing Evidence in the Context of Conductive Reasoning]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Blair]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Johnson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Conductive Argument. An Overlooked Type of Defeasible Reasoning]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Londres ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[College Publications]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pollock]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Defeasible Reasoning]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rips]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Adler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Reasoning: Studies in Human Inference and Its Foundations]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pollock]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Thinking about Acting: Epistemological Foundations for Rational Decision Making]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Nueva York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Oxford University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pollock]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[The MIT Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pollock]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[How to Reason Defeasibly]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></source>
<year>1992</year>
<volume>57</volume>
<page-range>1-42</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>Real Academia Española</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Diccionario de la lengua española]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<edition>22 ed.</edition>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rescher]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[N.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Plausible Reasoning: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Plausibilistic Inference]]></source>
<year>1976</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Assen ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Van Gorcum]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tversky]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kahneman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Psychological Review]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<volume>90</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>293-315</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tversky]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Koehler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Support Theory: A Non-Extensional Representation of Subjective Probability]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Psychological Review]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<volume>101</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>547-67</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B30">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vega-Reñón]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Aristotle&#8217;s Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Argumentation]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>12</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>95-113</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B31">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence and Law]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B32">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B33">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Legal Argumentation and Evidence]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Pennsylvania ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Penn State Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B34">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Toronto ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[University of Toronto Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B35">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rules for Plausible Reasoning]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Informal Logic]]></source>
<year>1992</year>
<volume>14</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>33-50</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B36">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tindale]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.W.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gordon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Applying Recent Argumentation Methods to Some Ancient Examples of Plausible Reasoning]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Argumentation]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<volume>28</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>85-119</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B37">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Reed]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Evaluating Corroborative Evidence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Argumentation]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>22</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>531-53</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B38">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Wolpert]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Unnatural Nature of Science]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Mass ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Harvard University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B39">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Woods]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.H]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gabbay]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>2</volume>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Amsterdam ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Elsevier]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B40">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Woods]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.H]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Walton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Argument. The Logic of Fallacies]]></source>
<year>1982</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Nueva York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[McGraw Hill]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
