<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032014000100069</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Prinz&#8217;s Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Artiga]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Marc]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universitat de Girona  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2014</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2014</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>46</volume>
<numero>136</numero>
<fpage>69</fpage>
<lpage>86</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032014000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary This paper addresses Prinz&#8217;s naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz 2000, 2002, 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz&#8217;s theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo discute la teoría del contenido conceptual de Prinz, que él ha defendido en diversas obras (Prinz 2000, 2002, 2006). Más concretamente, presento en detalle y evalúo críticamente su teoría del contenido referencial, que él distingue del contenido cognitivo o nominal. El artículo argumenta que la teoría de Prinz tiene cuatro problemas importantes, que pueden tener consecuencias significativas para su proyecto empiricista.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[concepts]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[naturalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[empiricism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[intentionality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[counterfactuals]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conceptos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[naturalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[empiricismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[intencionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contrafácticos]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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