<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032011000200003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.803</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[On the very idea of a robust alternative]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sobre la idea misma de una alternativa robusta]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Moya]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Carlos J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Valencia  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2011</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2011</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>43</volume>
<numero>128</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>26</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032011000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032011000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032011000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary: According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Según el Principio de Posibilidades Alternativas (PPA), un agente es moralmente responsable de una acción sólo si hubiera podido actuar de otro modo. La noción de alternativa robusta desempeña un papel prominente en ataques recien-tes al PPA basados en los llamados casos Frankfurt. En este artículo defiendo el PPA para la culpabilidad moral frente a casos Frankfurt propuestos recientemente por Derk Pereboom y David Widerker. Mi defensa descansa en algunos principios intuitivamente plausibles que dan lugar a una comprensión nueva del concepto de alternativa robusta. No trataré la cuestión de la verdad del PPA para acciones moralmente laudables.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Principle of Alternative Possibilities]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Frankfurt cases]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[blameworthiness]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Pereboom]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Widerker]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Principio de posibilidades alternativas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[casos Frankfurt]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[culpabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Pereboom]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Widerker]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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