<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032008000300037</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2008.996</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Contenido, sensación y percepción]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Content, Sensation and Perception]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fernández Prat]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Olga]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Facultad de Filosofía y Letras Departamento de Filosofía]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2008</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2008</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>40</volume>
<numero>120</numero>
<fpage>37</fpage>
<lpage>65</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032008000300037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032008000300037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032008000300037&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Este artículo pretende clarificar la relación entre los aspectos sensoriales de la percepción y el aspecto &#8220;demostrativo&#8221; sobre el que han llamado la atención autores como Evans y McDowell. Tras introducir un análisis husserliano en espíritu de los modos de presentación demostrativo-perceptuales, y con base en una versión de la teoría de los datos sensoriales -sin los defectos que la han hecho impopular recientemente entre los filósofos- se proponen correspondencias entre la &#8220;fase sensorial&#8221; y la &#8220;fase demostrativo-conceptual&#8221; de la percepción, caracterizadas, respectivamente por su contenido no conceptual y conceptual. El punto crucial de la relación entre ambos se explica entonces apelando a cierta operación sintética. Finalmente, se intenta mostrar que esta propuesta es más satisfactoria que la propuesta alternativa existente, debida a John Campbell.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[SUMMARY This paper aims at clarifying the relationship between the sensory aspects and the &#8220;demonstrative&#8221; aspect of perception that has attracted the interest of philosophers like Evans and McDowell. On the basis of a broadly Husserlian analysis of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation, on the one hand and, a recent version of the sense-data theory of perception on the other -without the drawbacks that have tended to render that theory impopular among philosophers- correspondences between the &#8220;sensory phase&#8221; and the &#8220;demonstrative and conceptual phase&#8221; of perception are proposed, once those &#8220;phases&#8221; have been characterized, respectively, by non-conceptual and conceptual contents. The key point of the relationship between these is then explained by appealing to a certain synthetic operation. Finally, an attempt is made to show that this is a more satisfactory proposal than the alternative by John Campbell.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[datos sensoriales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[modos de presentación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido demostrativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sense data]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[modes of presentation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[demonstrative content]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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