<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-8064</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Entreciencias: diálogos en la sociedad del conocimiento]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Entreciencias: diálogos soc. conoc.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-8064</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Escuela Nacional de Estudios Superiores]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-80642020000100315</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/enesl.20078064e.2020.22.75413</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El Servicio de Administración Tributaria y las multinacionales en México: un juego de señalización de la evasión fiscal]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Tax Administration Service and multinationals in Mexico: a signaling game for tax evasion]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rosas Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Beatriz]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Demmler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Michael]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>8</volume>
<numero>22</numero>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-80642020000100315&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-80642020000100315&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-80642020000100315&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen  Objetivo:  Analizar las regulaciones y multas de precios de transferencia en México desde el enfoque de la teoría de juegos.  Diseño metodológico:  Se utilizan dos modelos de señalización con información incompleta entre el Servicio de Administración Tributaria y las empresas multinacionales, en ellos las multinacionales tienen información privada que no comparten con la autoridad fiscal.  Resultados:  En el primer modelo se encuentran dos equilibrios de agrupación, uno en el que la multinacional reporta ingresos altos y la administración tributaria nunca audita, mientras el segundo se basa en que la multinacional reporta ingresos bajos y la autoridad fiscal audita con cierta probabilidad.  Limitaciones de la investigación: Debido a que no se cuenta con información precisa del porcentaje de multinacionales que evaden impuestos, el modelo se realizó con la información más reciente donde se supone que un 20 % de las personas morales evaden impuestos.  Hallazgos:  Se encuentra que un bajo nivel de auditorías no ayuda a reducir la evasión, un incremento en las multas incentiva las auditorías y que, mientras las multas variables continúen aumentando, las multinacionales no tendrán incentivos para evadir.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract  Purpose:  To analyze the regulations and fines of transfer prices in Mexico from the perspective of game theory.  Methodological design:  Two signaling models with incomplete information are used between the Tax Administration Service and multinational companies in which multinationals have private information that they do not share with the tax authority.  Results:  In the first model, there are two grouping equilibria, one in which the multinational company reports high income and the tax administration never audits, while the second is based on the fact that the multinational company reports low income and the tax authority audits with a certain probability.  Research limitations:  The models were made assuming that 20% of taxpayers evade taxes according to some studies because there is no precise information on the percentage of multinationals that evade taxes.  Findings:  It is found that a low level of audits does not reduce evasion, an increase in fines encourages audits and as long as variable fines continue to increase, multinationals will have no incentive to evade.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Teoría de señalización]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[multinacionales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[precios de transferencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evasión fiscal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[signaling theory]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[multinationals]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[transfer prices]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[tax evasion]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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