<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-2037</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Política y gobierno]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Polít. gob]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-2037</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C., División de Estudios Políticos]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-20372005000200313</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Los determinantes de la indisciplina partidaria. Apuntes sobre la conexión electoral en el Congreso mexicano, 2000-2003]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Díaz Rebolledo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jerónimo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,jeronimo@pgr.gob.mx  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>12</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>313</fpage>
<lpage>330</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-20372005000200313&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-20372005000200313&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-20372005000200313&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: La competencia electoral en México ha hecho que la conexión electoral de los legisladores, por largo tiempo ignorada, ahora pueda ser reconsiderada como una dinámica que influye en las votaciones en el Congreso. En ausencia de la reelección inmediata, los legisladores desarrollan un patrón de ambición progresiva que los lleva a tomar en cuenta las preferencias del electorado cuando deciden su voto en las iniciativas de ley. La hipótesis de este trabajo sugiere que la posición ideológica del electorado a nivel estatal y la popularidad presidencial explican por qué algunos congresistas se desvían de la línea de su partido durante las votaciones en el pleno, mientras que otros no. Esta hipótesis es preliminarmente avalada por la evidencia disponible.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conexión electoral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[ambición progresiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[disciplina partidaria]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[popularidad presidencial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reelección consecutiva]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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