<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-3380</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Economía: teoría y práctica]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Econ: teor. práct]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-3380</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, a través de la Unidad Iztapalapa, la Unidad Azcapotzalco y la Unidad Xochimilco, División de Ciencias Sociales]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-33802020000100043</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24275/etypuam/ne/522020/fanti</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Unions and Entry to Traditional and Network Industries]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sindicatos y su entrada a las industrias tradicionales y de redes]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fanti]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Luciano]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Buccella]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Domenico]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Pisa  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Italy</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Kozminski University  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Poland</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>52</numero>
<fpage>43</fpage>
<lpage>67</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-33802020000100043&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-33802020000100043&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-33802020000100043&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The paper analyzes the effects of unionization on the labor market under Right-to-Manage (RTM) and Sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) institutions, focusing particularly on the entry of a firm and comparing traditional and network industries. The findings show that under RTM, unions always play a pro-competitive role, while under EB they may become a barrier to entry -in the form of the payment of a fee to obtain a monopoly grant by an authority- into network industries with intense network effects. These results shed light on the importance of there being, on the one hand, unions and different bargaining agendas and on the other, network goods in the shape of industrial competition, with the evident implications of anti-trust and competition policies.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo se analizan los efectos de la sindicalización del mercado de trabajo en las instituciones con derechos administrativos (RTM, por sus siglas en inglés) y con negociación secuencial efectiva, (SEB, por sus siglas en inglés). Se enfoca en la entrada de una empresa comparando las industrias tradicionales y de redes. Los resultados demuestran que dentro de las RTM, los sindicatos desempeñan un papel pro-competitivo, y en las SEB suelen convertirse en una barrera para la entrada de recursos y por lo mismo producir efectos negativos en las industrias de redes. El estudio revela la importancia de la presencia de los sindicatos y las diferentes agendas de negociación, así como las implicaciones evidentes que los bienes de redes provocan en las políticas de competencia.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sequential efficient bargaining]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[right-to-manage]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[firm-union bargaining agenda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[entry]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[network effects]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[negociación secuencial efectiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[derechos administrativos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agenda de negociación sindical]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[entrada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[efectos de las redes]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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