<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872019000100099</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2019.13.13717</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Agency and Legal Responsibility: Epistemic and Moral Considerations]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Agencia y responsabilidad legal: consideraciones epistémicas y morales]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Montemayor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Carlos]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cáceres]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Enrique]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,San Francisco State University  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>13</numero>
<fpage>99</fpage>
<lpage>127</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100099&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100099&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100099&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: What kind of agency is required for legal standing? What are the cognitive and rational requirements assumed by legal systems about the subjects of the law? How is it that humans comply with these requirements? In previous work,1 we argued that these questions require a new approach to legal theory, based on recent findings in cognitive science, and which goes beyond extant neurolegal approaches. We now elaborate on this proposal, now focusing on issues regarding agency and normativity, including types of agency that are relevant for social epistemology. The main conclusion of the paper is that the high cognitive demands on the explicit rational capacities of agents assumed by legal philosophy are not only incompatible with findings in psychology, but also that a careful and systematic analysis of moral and epistemic agency is required to fully comprehend legal normativity. Our main argument is that forms of collective agency, moral and epistemic, differ from individual agency, which must also be distinguished as moral and epistemic. Crucially, collective agency differs from individual agency not merely because of differences in rational standards, but fundamentally because of constraints on the cognitive integration of information. Several consequences of this approach are assessed, including aspects of information integration for judgment and decision-making, reliable communication in epistemic agency, and the integration of moral considerations in legal reasoning. A thorough revision of the notion of &#8220;autonomy&#8221; is justified under the present proposal, partly because the standard requirements for legal standing and autonomy are too demanding and unrealistic in many cases, and partly because collective agency needs to be taken into consideration as a fundamental kind of legally responsible agency for processes of information integration. By relying on the distinction between epistemic and moral forms of reasoning, we explain how legal systems demand high levels of cognitive integration for legal responsibility at the collective level.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: ¿Qué tipo de agencia es necesaria para la personalidad jurídica? ¿Cuáles son los requisitos cognitivos y racionales que los sistemas legales asumen acerca de los sujetos de la ley? ¿Cómo es que los seres humanos cumplen con estos requisitos? En trabajo previo (Cáceres y Montemayor, 2016), hemos argumentado que estas preguntas requieren un nuevo acercamiento a la teoría del derecho, basado en hallazgos recientes en ciencia cognitiva, que van más allá de tratamientos teóricos neurolegales contemporáneos. Aquí construimos sobre esta propuesta, ahora enfocándonos en cuestiones de agencia y normatividad, incluyendo tipos de agencia que son relevantes para la epistemología social. La conclusión principal del artículo es que los muy estrictos requisitos cognitivos que se asumen sobre las capacidades explícitas de racionalidad de los agentes cognitivos, presupuestos por la ley, no sólo son incompatibles con los hallazgos en psicología, sino que un análisis sistemático de la agencia moral y epistémica también es necesario para poder entender la normatividad legal. El argumento principal es que tipos de agencia colectiva, moral y epistémica, difieren de la agencia individual, la cual también debe distinguirse como moral y epistémica. Fundamentalmente, la agencia colectiva difiere de la individual no sólo con base en diferencias con respecto a la racionalidad, sino también con base en los criterios de integración informativa. Varias consecuencias de este análisis son evaluadas, incluyendo aspectos concernientes a integración informativa para juicios y decisiones, comunicación fiable para la agencia epistémica, y la integración de consideraciones morales en el razonamiento jurídico. Una revisión comprensiva de la noción de &#8220;autonomía&#8221; es justificada por esta propuesta, en parte porque los requisitos comunes para la personalidad y autonomía jurídica son muy demandantes e inadecuados en muchos casos, y en parte porque la agencia colectiva debe tomarse en consideración como un tipo fundamental de agencia legal responsable para procesos de integración informativa. Basándonos en la distinción entre formas epistémicas y morales de razonamiento, explicamos cómo los sistemas legales necesitan de altos niveles de integración cognitiva para la responsabilidad legal a nivel colectivo.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Attention]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral Agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Epistemic Agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Consciousness and Attention Dissociation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Collective Agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Atención]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agencia moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agencia epistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[disociación entre consciencia y atención]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agencia colectiva]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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