<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872019000100067</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2019.13.13716</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Las decisiones judiciales: justificación y racionalidad]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Judicial Decisions: Justification and Rationality]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Caballero Elbersci]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Pedro]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>13</numero>
<fpage>67</fpage>
<lpage>98</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100067&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100067&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872019000100067&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: En este artículo se parte de la asunción común de que los ordenamientos jurídicos modernos exigen que las decisiones judiciales deben ser fundamentadas. Algunos filósofos del derecho, partiendo de esta exigencia práctica, han desarrollado diversas propuestas teóricas para explicar la estructura y el funcionamiento de las decisiones judiciales, pero también para ofrecer criterios de valoración que permitan determinar si cierta decisión judicial se encuentra propiamente justificada. En este artículo, en primer lugar, se reconstruyen algunas de estas propuestas teóricas y se clasifican en dos modelos diferentes: la teoría estrecha del silogismo judicial y la teoría amplia del silogismo judicial. En segundo lugar, se explicita un complicado problema que aqueja a estos modelos, a saber, la paradoja del seguimiento de reglas. En tercer lugar, se propone una manera de disolver este espinoso problema y, a su vez, de dar un paso adelante en la construcción de una nueva línea explicativa, que aquí llamaré &#8220;teoría pragmatista de las decisiones judiciales&#8221;. Por último, se ofrece una manera plausible de acomodar conceptualmente los aportes teóricos más relevantes de cada uno de los tres enfoques.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: This article begins with the common assumption that modern legal systems require that judicial decisions must be substantiated. Some legal philosophers, starting from this practical requirement, have developed different theoretical proposals to explain the structure and functioning of judicial decisions, but also offer evaluation criteria that enables us to determine if a certain judicial decision is properly justified. In this article, some of these proposals are reconstructed and classified into two different models: the narrow theory of judicial syllogism and the broad theory of judicial syllogism. Secondly, a complicated problem that afflict these models, &#8220;the rule following paradox&#8221;, is made explicit. I then explore a step forward to overcome this problem and I call it the &#8220;Pragmatist Theory of Judicial Decision&#8221;. Finally, a plausible way to conceptually accommodate the most relevant theoretical contributions of each of these three models is offered.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Decisión judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[racionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reglas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[seguimiento de reglas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normatividad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Judicial Decision]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Following Rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Normativity]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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