<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872016000100111</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Moralized Conventions in Law]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Convenciones moralizadas en el derecho]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[López-Lorenzo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Miguel José]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,King's College London  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>GB</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>10</numero>
<fpage>111</fpage>
<lpage>134</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100111&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100111&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100111&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:Suppose Jack wishes to settle Blackacre upon Jill under a trust. If the law requires him to manifest that trust in writing, in virtue of what does this standard obtain? What makes it the case that the law requires what it does? One view is that legal standards constitutively depend for their existence and content on social conventions followed by judges and other officials. Another is that certain moral principles make propositions of law true and thus give law its content. Pace Dworkin, I do not believe that we should endorse the latter at the expense of the former. My view is that we do better to reconcile the thought that there are social conventions at the foundations of law with the thesis that certain moral principles feature in a constitutive explanation of legal standards. I shall begin by elaborating a moralized conception of what social conventions are and how they work. With that in place, my next task will be to demonstrate how and why we do better to integrate these two competing perspectives on the nature of law; although I emphasize that the argument throughout is speculative rather than conclusive.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:Supongamos que Pedro desea otorgar ciertos derechos de una propiedad a María bajo la figura del "trust". Si el derecho le exige a Pedro que esto se haga de manera escrita, ¿Cómo se obtiene este requisito? ¿Qué es lo que hace que el derecho exija lo que exige? Una respuesta es que las directivas en el derecho, para su existencia y contenido, dependen de manera constitutiva en convenciones sociales seguidas por jueces y otros oficiales. Otra es que ciertos principios morales hacen que las proposiciones del derecho sean verdaderas y por lo tanto le dan el contenido al derecho. Con debido reconocimiento a las aportaciones de Dworkin, sostengo que no debemos defender la segunda respuesta e ignorar la primera. Mi punto de vista es que logramos avances importantes en el debate, si reconciliamos la noción de que existen convenciones sociales en los fundamentos del derecho, con la tesis de que ciertos principios morales figuran en una explicación constitutiva de las directivas. Inicio este artículo con la elaboración de una concepción moralizada de lo que son las convenciones sociales y cómo funcionan; para pasar a una segunda etapa que intenta demostrar cómo y por qué resulta mejor integrar estas dos respuestas distintas en relación a la naturaleza del derecho; sin embargo, advierto que a lo largo del artículo, el argumento es más especulativo que concluyente.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Convencionalismo jurídico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[convenciones sociales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prácticas jurídicas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normatividad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Conventionalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Social Conventions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Morality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Practices]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Normativity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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