<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872016000100003</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Dworkin's 'One-Right-Answer' Thesis]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La tesis de ''la única respuesta correcta'' en Dworkin]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guest]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Stephen]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University College London  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>GB</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>10</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>21</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872016000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:Dworkin believes legal arguments are evaluative arguments of political morality and so his legal theory depends on the idea that there are one-right-answers to most evaluative questions. That objective truth - or fallibility - is embedded in morally evaluative discourse is obvious from its logic. For we can't deny that there is no moral truth merely because there is nothing 'external' or 'demonstrable' that determines that truth; that denial merely affirms moral permissibility (by saying it is not false, eg, that abortion is wrong). However, our discourse could be in error and the better argument for one-right-answers is morally evaluative, not descriptive-analytic. There are two such moral arguments. The first is that 'demonstrable' truth, implied by the 'external' criticism, implies a rigid sense of community and makes little sense of the complexity of our moral rights. The second is that abandoning truth altogether would mean that morality was no more than 'making things up' arbitrarily. As a corollary, the 'unity of value' thesis means not much more than that, given the moral requirement of non-demonstrable truth, lawyers and other political moralists have a duty to construct final justifications that assume competitive tensions between relevant principles are resolved without logical contradiction or conflict.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:Dworkin piensa que los argumentos jurídicos son argumentos evaluativos de moralidad política y por lo tanto su teoría del derecho depende de la idea de que existan únicas respuestas correctas a la mayoría de preguntas evaluativas. El hecho de que la verdad objetiva - o falibilidad - esté inmersa en el discurso evaluativo moral resulta obvio de su propia lógica. No podemos negar de que no existe ninguna verdad moral debido a que no existe nada "externo" o "demostrable" que determina dicha verdad; esta negación afirma, a su vez, una permisibilidad moral (al decir, por ejemplo, que no es falso que el aborto sea malo). Sin embargo, nuestro discurso puede estar en un error y puede ser que el mejor argumento para la tesis de la única respuesta correcta sea moralmente evaluativo y no descriptivo- analítico. Existen dos tipos de argumentos morales en este sentido. El primero es que la verdad "demostrable" propio de la crítica externa, implica un sentido rígido de lo que es una comunidad y le da poco sentido a la complejidad de nuestros derechos morales, El segundo implica que si abandonamos la verdad en su conjunto, ello significa que la moralidad no era más que "crear las cosas" de manera arbitraria. Como consecuencia, podemos decir que la tesis de la "unidad del valor" no es más que esto: debido a las exigencias morales de verdades no-demostrables, los abogados y políticos morales tienen un deber de construir justificaciones finales que reconozcan tensiones competitivas entre principios, y resolverlas sin contradicciones lógicas ni conflictos.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Tesis de la respuesta correcta]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[objetividad moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razonamiento jurídico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[integridad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Right-Answer Thesis]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral Objectivity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Reasoning]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Integrity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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