<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0188-6649</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Tópicos (México)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0188-6649</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0188-66492018000100353</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21555/top.v0i54.858</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Una explicación del autoconocimiento psicológico]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[An Explanation of Psychological Self-Knowledge]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vidal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Javier]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Concepción  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>54</numero>
<fpage>353</fpage>
<lpage>392</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0188-66492018000100353&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0188-66492018000100353&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0188-66492018000100353&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Siguiendo la aproximación de C. Peacocke, desarrollaré una explicación del autoconocimiento psicológico en términos de los estados y contenidos involucrados en la transición desde un estado mental consciente a un juicio de orden superior. Ahora bien, parece que la mera conciencia de un estado mental no representa explícitamente o hace manifiesto de algún modo al sujeto de ese estado, en cuyo caso esto plantea una objeción à la Lichtenberg a la explicación de Peacocke. Tras adoptar una teoría auto-representacional del carácter subjetivo de la experiencia, argumentaré que la representación mediante la cual una experiencia consciente se representa a sí misma como sí misma tiene un contenido de se implícito. Es así una explicación que excluye una objeción à la Lichtenberg porque el uso de la primera persona en un juicio de orden superior resulta ser dependiente de contenido.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract Following &#1057;. Peacocke's approach, I will develop an expia-nation of psychological self-knowledge in terms of the states and contents involved in the transition from a conscious mental state to a higher-order judgement. Now, it seems that the mere awareness of a mental state does not explicitly represent or in any way manifest the subject of that state, in which case it poses an à la Lichtenberg challenge to Peacocke's explanation. After embracing a self-representational theory of the subjective character of experience, I will argue that the representation through which a conscious experience represents itself as itself has an implicit de se content. Thus it is an explanation which precludes an à la Lichtenberg challenge because the use of the first-person in a higher-order judgement turns out to be content-dependent.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[autoconocimiento psicológico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[carácter subjetivo de la experiencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido de se implícito]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[relativismo semántico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teoría auto-representacional de la conciencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[psychological self-knowledge]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[subjective character of experience]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[implicit de se content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[semantic relativism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[self-representational theory of consciousness]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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