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Valenciana
versión impresa ISSN 2007-2538
Valenciana vol.3 no.5 Valenciana ene./jun. 2010
https://doi.org/10.15174/rv.v0i5.237
Artículos
Progreso científico mediante convergencia cognitiva. Socavando la inferencia pesimista
1Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa
La idea de progreso científico ha sido estudiada por diferentes autores como Philip Kitcher (2001), Hasok Chang (2004) y Alexander Bird (2007). En cierto sentido son reacciones a los planteamientos tradicionales que realizaron sobre el mismo tópico Thomas Kuhn (1962), Larry Laudan (1977), Irme Lakatos (1970) y Ilkka Niiniluoto (1984). Estos autores clásicos articulan la noción de progreso científico con base en cuatro pilares: a) la idea de progreso como interna a disciplinas; b) la medición principal del progreso es la resolución de problemas, c) las teorías como las depositarias dominantes del conocimiento científico y d) una distinción entre progreso empírico y progreso teórico. En este trabajo evalúo críticamente estas tesis para mostrar que tienen algunas fallas, que es necesario corregir para elaborar una noción de progreso científico que supere los retos cognitivos de la así llamada inferencia pesimista.
Palabras clave: progreso científico; inferencia pesimista; evolución cognitiva; crecimiento de información; retroalimentación
Some authors have recently examined the idea of scientific progress as Philip Kitcher (2001), Hasok Chang (2004) and Alexander Bird (2007). Their fundamental reactions were against traditional points of view about this issue from authors as Thomas Kuhn (1962), Larry Laudan (1977), Irme Lakatos (1970) y Ilkka Niiniluoto (1984). Four main theses supported these traditional views about the idea of scientific progress, namely, a) the idea of progress is internal to scientific disciplines; b) problem solving is an adequate measurement of scientific progress; c) scientific knowledge is mainly articulated by theories and d) there is a distinction between empirical progress and theoretical progress. In this paper I appraise and criticize these theses in order to elaborate a satisfactory notion of scientific progress which overcomes the epistemic challenges of the so called pessimistic inference.
Keywords: scientific progress; pessimistic inference; cognitive evolution; growth of information; feedback
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