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Valenciana
Print version ISSN 2007-2538
Valenciana vol.2 n.3 Valenciana Jan./Jun. 2009
https://doi.org/10.15174/rv.v0i3.256
Artículos
Autoconciencia prerreflexiva: dos argumentos contra las teorías representacionales de la conciencia
1Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM.
Las teorías representacionales de la conciencia intentan dar cuenta de la experiencia fenoménica con términos mentales sin implicar la conciencia. Las dos principales son el representacionalismo y las teorías de representación de orden superior. El principal argumento para la primera es el de la transparencia de la experiencia, según el cual es imposible discernir, vía introspección, las propiedades intrínsecas de una experiencia de x que no se experimenten como propiedades de x. El representacionalismo sostiene que nuestras experiencias muestran rasgos cualitativos que son idénticos a las propiedades de los objetos que nuestra experiencia representa y que, por lo tanto, el carácter fenoménico de la experiencia es idéntico a su contenido representacional. Las teorías de representación de orden superior o HOR (por higher-order representation), por su parte, explican los estados conscientes en términos de una representación de orden superior, que puede tomar la forma de una cuasi percepción o un pensamiento que va dirigido a un estado mental de primer orden. En este artículo presento dos argumentos contra las teorías representacionales desde una teoría que establece que toda experiencia consciente lleva implícita un tipo de autoconciencia prerreflexiva caracterizada por tener un aspecto por tener un aspecto: ser característicamente mía o para mí (sentido de pertenencia). El primer argumento es contra el representacionalismo. El argumento sostiene que este sentido de pertenencia (1) es un rasgo intrínseco de la experiencia y (2) es discernible por medio de la introspección; por lo tanto, el carácter fenoménico de la experiencia no es idéntico a su contenido representacional y por consiguiente, el representacionalismo es erróneo. El segundo argumento es el problema de los estados de orden superior sin un objetivo al cual dirigirse (i.e., un estado mental de primer orden). Supongamos que un sujeto S tiene una representación de orden superior (HOR) de encontrarse en un estado de dolor d, pero sin tener d. Según las teorías HOR, d no es consciente porque no existe. Pero, como S tiene una HOR acerca de d entonces tendrá una experiencia fenoménica de d. No obstante este resultado es incoherente. Para la teoría de la autoconciencia prerreflexiva, d no es consciente si no le pertenece a S, pero como S sí tiene conciencia de d (siendo d otro tipo de estado diferente al dolor, e.g., una creencia, una imaginería mental), entonces este sentido de pertenencia es lo que hace que d sea una experiencia fenoménica.
Palabras clave: conciencia fenoménica; autoconciencia prerreflexiva; sentido de pertenencia; representacionalismo; representación de orden superior
Representational theories of consciousness try to explain phenomenal experience by the use of terms without implying consciousness. The two main theories are representationalism and higher-order representational theories (HOR). The key argument for the first one is the transparency of experience according to which, it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic properties of an experience of x that are not experienced as properties of x. Representationalism states that our experiences show qualitative features that are identical to the properties things are represented as having, and therefore, phenomenal character of experience is identical to its representational content. On the other hand, HOR theories account for conscious states in terms of higher-order representation, that may take the form of a quasi-perception or a thought that it’s directed to a first-order mental state. In this paper I put forward two arguments against representational theories, on the basis of a theory which affirms that every conscious experience has an implicit pre-reflective self-consciousness of some kind, that it is characterized of having a for-me-ness aspect (sense of ownership). The first argument is against representationalism. The argument asserts that this sense of ownership (1) is an intrinsic aspect of experience, and (2) is discernible via introspection; therefore, the phenomenal character of experiences is not identical to its representational content, and consequently, representationalism is false. The second argument is the problema being in a pain state p, but without having p. According to HOR theories, p is non-conscious, because it doesn’t exist. But, S’s having HOR about p, will cause that S would have a phenomenal experience of p. Nevertheless this result in incoherent. For pre-reflexive self-consciousness theory, on the other hand, p will not be a conscious state if it doesn’t belong to S, nevertheless S does have consciousness of p (being p different from pain, e.g., a believe, a mental imagery) therefore this sense of ownership is what makes p a phenomenal experience.
Keywords: phenomenal consciousness; pre-reflective self-consciousness; sense of ownership; representationalism; higher-order representation
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